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L Introduction
Writing about Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 _ which
set new standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence in the federal
courts - is a bit like writing about Salem witchcrat, as explained by colonial
historian Mary Beth Norton:
Random Early Americanist: "What are you working on now?"
Me (with some hesitation): "Salem witchcraL"
Early Americanist... : "But... surely there's nothing new to say."
2
Professor Norton, however, had become "progressively dissatisfied with [the]
limited framework" in the leading study of the social mileau of 1692 Salem
because of its insistence that gender is irrelevant to the story.3
As to the ongoing debates about law and science, we have become pro-
gressively dissatisfied with the limited philosophical framework that predomi-
nates in the judicial and scholarly accounts of the validity and admissibility of
scientific testimony. Although "Daubert, perhaps, represents nothing more,
or less, than that henceforth the legal culture must assimilate the scientific
culture, '4 the interdisciplinary interaction between law and the philosophy of
science has, to date, been disappointing. While the process of assimilation
1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. Mary Beth Norton, Finding the Devil in the Details of the Salem Witchcraft Trials,
CHRON. HIGiER EDuC., Jan. 21,2000, at B4.
3. Id. Professor Norton explained:
Along with many other historians, I had once accepted Paul S. Boyer and Stephen
Nissenbaum's 1974 Salem Possessed: The Social Origins of Witchcraft... as the
final word on the subject .... [However,] I found it inconceivable that gender
could have played absolutely no role in the development and outcome of the crisis.
Id.
4. 1 DAVIDL. FAIGMANET AL., MODERN SCImNTIFC EVIDENCE: THELAWAND SCIENCE
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ix (1997).
5. Just as scholars who engage in "historical, philosophical, or managerial studies of
science and technology... become increasingly autonomous from the sciences and technologies
they study," DAVID J. HESS, SCIENCE STUDIES: ANADVANCED INMoDUCTION 149 (1997), their
work is largely absent from the representations of science dominating legal literature.
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certainly has captured the attention of legal scholars - much has been written
about Daubert6 ("an avalanche of commentary"7) - only a few commentators
have focused on Daubert's minimalistic description of the scientific process
or the philosophy of science that underlies Daubert and its progeny.
According to many recent scholarly accounts, the "fairy tale" view of
science as objective and its history as a linear progression toward truth about
nature has been replaced in the federal courts by the modem view of science
as tentative, uncertain, and embedded in culture. In our view, this account is
a new fairy tale about how those who have rejected the old tale have settled
matters. This new fairy tale suggests a certain stability with respect to the
history and philosophy of science that does not exist. There are not two
schools of thought concerning the nature of scientific activity, but rather a
complex and ongoing theoretical discourse that renders interdisciplinary
"borrowings" by law from science studies intensely problematical.' The
dualistic model is, therefore, an interdisciplinary trap. It oversimplifies the
debates about the characteristics of scientific activity and eclipses at least one
major insight about science: It is problematical to define science as either a
natural or a social activity. The latest and most helpful scholarly work among
those who study scientific activity reformulates contemporary accounts of
science to avoid the dualistic trap that scholars have repeated over and over
again in most commentary on Daubert.9
6. See Dick Thornburgh, Junk Science - The Lawyer's Ethical Responsibilities, 25
FORDHAMURB. L.J. 449,455 (1998) (pointing out that judges and scholars have cited Daubert
in more than 1000 federal and state cases and in more than 1000 law review articles).
7. Edward 3. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law Visits Jurassic Park The Far-Reaching
Implication of the Daubert Court'sRecognition of the Uncertainty of the Scientific Enterprise,
81 IOWA L. REV. 55, 58 (1995) (noting "avalanche of commentary" generated within first year
following Daubert, citing two symposia, and referring to "massive - and growing - volume of
commentary").
8. Even defining "science studies" is intensely problematical. The term usually refers
to more radical studies of science - movements like the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
(SSK); Science, Technology, and Society Studies (STS); Science and Culture Studies; or post-
modem studies of science. These studies are referred to by critics as a "veritable carnival of
approaches and methodologies," including feminists, Marxists, ethnomethodologists, and
deconstructionists "who find significance in rhetoric" or "who emphasize the role of patronage
and the power of empire." Noretta Koertge, Scrutinizing Science Studies, in AHOUSE BUILT ON
SAND 1,3 (NorettaKoertge ad., 1998). Koertge winced at this use ofthe term "science studies,"
because she felt "privileged to work in one of the oldest 'science studies' departments [Indiana
University] in the country (although we never used that label)." All serious scholars in history,
philosophy, and sociology of science could be said to be engaged in science studies. Id. at 5.
In this Article, we use the term "science studies" to refer generally to traditional and
critical views of science, but readers should recognize that the term is often reserved for more
radical approaches.
9. See generally Philip Kitcher,A Pleafor Science Studies, in AHOUSE BUILT ONSAND,
supra note 8, at 32-56. Kitcher identified a realist-rationalist cluster of ideas which included
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We argue that the view proposed by many commentaries on Daubert -
that the Court vacillated between traditionalist and constructivist views of
science - sets up an erroneous dichotomy that not only eclipses the diversity
ofpositions in science studies but also misses entirely athird approach adopted
by some federal courts in applying Daubert. This third approach is neither
traditional nor constructivist. Rather, it is a pragmatic approach to scientific
evidence we call "pragmatic constructivism," which "constructs a science for
the case" and satisfies neither traditionalists nor constructivists. At first blush,
it even appears that this pragmatic approach sidesteps altogether the complex
philosophical questions about the nature of science and scientific progress.
But why should we, in law, care about the philosophy of science? After
all, science does not need philosophical reflection or criticism to succeed,' °
and we would not question the legal admissibility of a scientific explanation
canons of reason and evidence, and a view of science as progressive, as offering representational
knowledge about the world and as fallible but roughly correct. Id. at 34. Kitcher also identified
a socio-historical cluster of ideas, which included a view of scientists as cognitively limited and
functioning within complex social groups with long histories, and a view of science as embed-
ded in social structures. Id. at 36. The "challenge today is to do justice to both clusters of
themes," id. at 45, but there is substantial disagreement and debate about how that is done.
Thus, there are numerous "third way[s]" to avoid the seeming choice between an overly realist
view of science that ignores science's history and social structures, and a social constructivist
view of science that disengages science from natural reality. For a lively debate that captures
various "third way[s]," see TAING THE NATURALIST TURN, OR How REAL PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE Is Dom (Werner Callebaut ed., 1993) [hereinafter Callebaut] (confirming continuum
of positions between realist-rationalist and socio-historical poles).
10. See JOSEPH ROUSE, ENAGING SCIENCE: How TO UNDERSTAND ITS PRACTICES
PHILOSOPICAILY 3 (1996). Rouse stated:
[We are not entirely clear on what is at stake among competing philosophical
interpretations of scientific knowledge. What difference would it make if we were
to discover that science is best understood instrumentally or realistically or in terms
of its historically progressive rationality?... [l1t is striking how limited are the
ambitions of so many contemporary philosophical interpreters of the sciences.
Id.; see also RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBIECTIViSM AND RELATIVISM SCIENCE,
HERMENEUnCS, AND PRAxuS 89 (1983) (arguing history of science "essential" for historians
but not for scientists). Bernstein observed that
Sometimes critics of Feyerabend and Kuhn have interpreted them as saying that
physicists ought to be historians and hermeneuticians, but this is silly .... Knowl-
edge of science's past and study of its history are essential for philosophers and
historians who want to understand the nature or image of science but are not
necessarily relevant for developing the skills required to be a practicing
scientist....
Id. Significantly, scholars have challenged the notion that the history of science is crucial to
our conception of science today. See Thomas M. Norton-Smith, A Consideration of the Role
of the History of Science in the Philosophy of Science, 31 MIDWEST Q. 330, 335 (1990)
(arguing that while recent historical examples of scientific discovery and progress may be
helpful, older historical examples may not be so relevant to understanding present-day science).
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because the scientist did not have a sufficient philosophical account of the
scientific enterprise. Yet when judges are faced with conflicting scientific
testimony and are required to evaluate the validity and admissibility of that
testimony, they need a generalized template - an abstract picture of how
science works. Judges know from experience that science is sometimes
tentative and uncertain, that scientists often disagree, that scientists have other
interests (in their careers, in helping a client, in getting paid), and that once-
established theories are later replaced. They also know, however, that law
needs scientific expertise. Accordingly, they will, perhaps unwittingly,
develop a philosophy of science to square these realities.
For some, however, the scientific enterprise may function as a particu-
larly stable source of insights for law, such that a judge's philosophical or
ideological inclinations should not affect his or her evaluation (under
Daubert) of scientific reliability." After all, the scientific method purports to
be an objective standard outside of legal discourse. We will, however, dem-
onstrate that a philosophical position on science is unavoidable and that
judicial assessments of scientific reliability after Daubert can vary according
to undisclosed philosophies of science. Specifically, the development of
Daubert in subsequent federal court opinions subtly reveals three interpretive
principles that implicitly reflect judicial philosophies of science. These
principles function inconsistently to modify Daubert standards of admissibil-
ity. After illustrating the varied operations of the three principles, we show
how more liberal approaches to admissibility are consistent with contempo-
rary insights from the history, philosophy, and sociology of science, whereas
the more restrictive or conservative approaches reflect an outdated vision of
the scientific enterprise.
In Part II below, we describe the limited philosophical framework that we
criticize. In Part II, we construct our own framework, oriented to philosophi-
cal concerns, for analysis of cases involving the admissibility of expert
testimony under Daubert. Part IV begins with a re-reading of Daubert to
identify the philosophies of science reflected in the opinion. We then tmrn to
post-Daubert cases to show how the federal courts manipulate Daubert
guidelines and several auxiliary principles to fit different philosophical
perspectives on the scientific enterprise. In order to demonstrate that the
popular notion found in court opinions and legal scholarship of "two views of
science" is highly oversimplified, Part V provides a brief survey ofthe debates
concerning the history, philosophy, and sociology of science. Part VI traces
the '"wo views" thesis in Daubert and in selected commentaries on Daubert.
11. But see Richard E. Redding & N. Dickon Reppucci, Effects of Lawyers' Socio-Polit-
icalAttitudes on TheirJudgmentsofSocialScience inLegalDecisionMaking,23 LAW &HUM.
BEHAV. 31 (1999) (finding trial judges' evidentiary rulings on socially controversial evidence
biased by their own sociopolitical opinions).
57 WASH. &LE L. REV 685 (2000)
In Part VII, we explain how legal literature has misappropriated the "social
constuctivist" view of science, argue that the positivism that scholars set up
against constructivist views is not the only alternative, and identify a third
position - pragmatic constructivism - that has been appropriated in law and
exemplified in several post-Daubert federal court opinions. This position,
which represents a weak constructivist approach towards scientific evidence,
finds support among some contemporary science studies scholars. We con-
clude, however, that this interdisciplinary borrowing often fails because the
hoped-for stability (for law) from the insights of science studies runs up
against the hidden instability of those disciplines.
Thus, the paradox referred to in our title is that the field of science
studies is too complex and unsettled for interdisciplinary engagement with
law. Any position taken by the United States Supreme Court, therefore,
would have been controversial and subject to endless attack, requiring a time-
consuming defense. For example, if the Court viewed science as a social
enterprise supported by rhetorical conventions and by insfitutional practices
subject to bias, it would have been difficult to decide how to investigate and
identify rhetorical networks and institutional bias. Likewise, if the Court
viewed science as a realist enterprise, in reaction to historicist and social
constructivist accounts of science, it would have been difficult to choose
between competing contemporary accounts of science as representational
model-building, as a probabilistic inquiry, or as conceptual evolution, to name
a few important realist projects.
But once the Court began talking about science, the interdisciplinary
engagement necessarily began and the contours of a philosophical position
began to appear. The only two options at that point were to explicate and
adequately defend the Court's position, which was unlikely, or to maintain
enough ambiguity to let lower court judges and scholarly commentators deal
with the problem, which was the path taken inDaubert. The paradox persists,
nevertheless, because even judges who want to avoid entanglement with
debates in the philosophy of science must somehow characterize science and
unwittingly take a position in those debates. The only escape, described later
in this Article as "pragmatic legal constructivism," is to set aside the philo-
sophical problems of defining science. This move ends up conceding, unin-
tentionally, that law's science is almost wholly independent from the scientific
enterprise.
IU Daubert: A Limited Framework for Understanding Science
The United States Supreme Court was on controversial ground when, in
Daubert, it began to reflect upon the characteristics of scientific knowledge
and methodology. While it seemed necessary to clarify the elements of scien-
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tific validity when setting a new standard for the admissibility of scientific
evidence in federal courts, the task proved problematical. Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, in his partial dissent, immediately observed that the twenty-two amicus
briefs filed with the Court were "markedly different from typical briefs."' 2 He
also claimed not to understand "what is meant" by the statement that "the
scientific status of a theory depends on its 'falsifiability'" and remarked that
he suspected that some trial judges would likewise be confused. 3 More
importantly, the Court's analysis required an engagement with a highly con-
tested field of inquiry. For decades, debates over the nature of scientific dis-
covery and progress have thrived among historians, philosophers, sociologists,
and more recently, anthropologists, ethnologists, and even literary theorists,
not to mention reflective Scientists. 14 The Daubert Court was unable, there-
fore, to enter the field of science studies, to find the established definitions of
scientific knowledge and methodology, and to bring those stable insights home
to law. Rather, the Court was required to engage an ongoing controversy.
From the face of Justice Blackmum's opinion in Daubert, however, one
might not notice that defining science is both problematical and controversial.
The opinion certainly is framed as progressive and as an opportunity to re-
articulate and re-interpret admissibility standards under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, but the Court's observations about the scientific enterprise are pre-
sented almost as facts of general notice. Everybody knows, it would seem, that
"there are no certainties in science'"'i and that publication in scientific journals
"does not necessarily correlate with reliability.' 6 For whatever reason, proba-
bly rhetorical, Justice Blackmun did not mention that the amicus briefs re-
flected atleast-two competing pictures ofscientific ativityorthatthe Court was
not simply describing science, but choosing among alternative descriptions.
The undisclosed controversy in Daubert7 is supposedly between adher-
ents of the traditional picture of science as an objective inquiry into nature
12. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 599 (1993) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
13. Id.at60l.
14. See generally RONALD N. GIElRE, SCIENCE WrrTOr LAWS (1999); DAVID L. HU-L,
SCIENCEAS PROCESS: ANEVOLUTIONARYACCOUNTOFTHESOCIALANDCONCEPTUALDEVEL-
OPmENToFScIENcE(1988); PHILP KrrcHmR, TBEADVANCBENT OF SCIENCE: ScmNcEWITH-
OUTLEGEND,OBjCIIVY WrrHOUT ILLUSIONS (1993); LARRYLAUDAN, BEYONDPosrIISM
ANDRELATiVIsMb THEORYMEHODANDECE (199 6)DEBORuMAYOERRORANDTHE
GROWTH OF EXPERIMENTAL KNOWLEDGE (1996); ANDREW PICKERING, THE MANGE OF
PRACTICE: TIME, AGENCY, AND SCIENCE (1995); ROUSE, supra note 10.
15. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
16. Id. at 593.
17. The undisclosed controversy in Daubert is obvious in the amicus briefs submitted
in the case and in the flood of scholarly commentary that followed the opinion. E.g., Erica
Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How JudgesAvoid the Science in Scientific Evidence, 71
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or reality, as opposed to critics who recognize that science is a social and
cultural activity, that theoretical commitments affect observation, that the his-
tory of science is not one of linear progress, and that science is always tenta-
tive and uncertain. At first glance, that dichotomy is helpful in understanding
the influential amicus briefs in Daubert, the Daubert opinion itself, the argu-
ments among legal scholars about Daubert, and the extra-legal controversy
among historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science that was imported
into law in Daubert. Indeed, the two-view dualism is a useful description of
a set of challenges, raised roughly in the 1970s, to traditional accounts of
empirical scientific methodology as the most rational, logical, and objective
source of knowledge."8 Critics could point to the failure of historians to
TEMP. L. REV. 55 (1998); M. Neil Browne et al., The EpistemologicalRole of Expert Witnesses
and.Toxic Torts, 36 AM. Bus. L.. 1 (1998); Daniel I Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L.
REV. 699 (1998); Ellen E. Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism
MeetsBias andDeference, 77 OP. L. REV. 59 (1998); Margaret Farrell, Daubert v. Merril Dow
Pharm., Inc.: Epistemology and Legal Process, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 2183 (1994); Michael H.
Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or Double Error?, 40 ARIZ L.
REV. 753 (1998); Imwinkelried, supra note 7; Brian Stuart Koukoutchos, Solomon Meets Gali-
leo (and Isn't Quite Sure What to Do with Him), 15 CARDozo L. REv. 2237 (1994); ErinK. L.
Mahaney,Assessing the Fitness ofNovelScientifc Evidence in the Post-Daubert Era: Pesticide
Exposure Cases as a ParadigmforDeterminingAdmissibility, 26 ENVTL. L. 1161 (1996); John
H. Mansfield, Scientific Evidence Under Daubert, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1996); Allison Morse,
SocialScience in the Courtroom: Expert Testimony andBattered Women, 21 HAMlNE L. REV.
287 (1998) (stating that Daubert "vacillates between two paradigmatic world views, the Posi-
tivist and the Constructivist").
18. See Paul Horwich, Introduction to WORLD CHANGES: THOMAS KUHN AND THE
NATURE OF ScINcE 2 (Paul Horwich ed., 1993). Horwich stated:
According to the old picture, each scientist proceeds by increasing his stock of
observed facts, employing a set of nondeductive logical principles to determine
which set of theoretical sentences best explains these facts, and thereby accumulat-
ing theoretical knowledge. This rather tempting conception [assumes]... that
there is such a thing as the absolute truth independent of language and theory
[and] ... that there exists a theory-neutral body of observable facts ....
Id. Horwich's account of the new philosophy of science, like most accounts, begins with the
publication in 1962 of Thomas Kuhn's The Structure ofScientific Revolutions.
Kuhn's critique called into question many of the central elements of the traditional
picture - the concept of absolute truth, the observation/theory distinction, the
determinacy of rational choice, and the normative function of the philosophy of
science - and it provided an alternative model of scientific change that dispensed
with these notions altogether.
Id at 1. In another formulation, Kuhn "assailed the universal adjudicating power of experi-
ments, and therefore their independence from theory. Instead of arguing that observation must
precede theory, Kuhn contended that theory has to precede observation." PETERGAusoN, How
EXPMMTS END 8 (1987). If Kuhn emphasized how theoretical expectations organize
perception, some sociologists of science have gone further to denigrate the role of nature by
emphasizing how class, religion, professional interests, group commitments, and presupposi-
tions "condition the admissible phenomena in such a way as to render a particular theory and
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"rationally reconstruct" discovery, to episodes in the history of science when
empirical assumptions changed radically, and to the influence of presupposi-
tions on observation, all in an attempt to describe accurately and modestly the
genesis and growth of scientific knowledge. Even in the 1970s, however, it
would have been improper, except in the most general sense, to say that there
were two views of science. Disagreements persisted among the critics, with
some more radical in their critique of scientific orthodoxy than others. Most
significantly, the critical schools of the 1970s continued to develop, studies
of scientific activity appeared in numerous disciplines, and a lively debate
continues about how best to describe the power and limitations of scientific
methodology and knowledge. There are almost as many positions in the
debate as there are leading scholars in the field.'9
In many recent accounts, the acknowledgment that science is always a
human enterprise involving social institutions and linguistic conventions does
its associated experiments closed and self-referential." Id. at 10. Some are more willing than
others to downplay the role of nature in science. If those who think nature is accessible to
science are realists and those who concede that nature influences science are closet realists, a
few more positions are available before you get to full-blown social constructivism in science.
For example, facts can be viewed as constructed against the resistances of the natural (and
sociall) order - that veridical reality will only allow our constructions to go so far. See JONA-
THAN PorIrE, REPRESENTING REAIrrY: DISCOURSE, RBETORIC AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
36 (1996); Karen BaradAgentialRealism: FeministInterventions in UnderstandingScientific
Practices, in THE SCIENCE STUDIES READER 1, 2 (Mario Biagioli ed., 1999) ("Agential
Realism... acknowledges that there is a sense in which 'the world kicks back ..... "); K. D.
Knorr Ceina, The Care ofthe SelfandBlind Variation: The Disuniv ofTwo LeadingSciences,
in THE DImuNrryOF SCIENCE: BOUNDARmS, CONTExTS ANDPoWER287,308 (P. Galison &D.
Stump eds., 1995); Joseph Rouse,BeyondEpistemic Sovereignty, in THE DISUNiTYOF SCIENCE,
supra, at 398, 517-18 n.27 (regarding "resistance," Rouse does not "respect any sharp distinc-
tion between actions by people and behavior by things").
19. For example, Philip Kitcher, a leading philosopher of science, characterized his view
as realist and progressive. Realism is suspect, however, "not only among those who are
skeptical about the progressiveness of science but also for champions of alternative accounts
of scientific progress." K1rCHER, supra note 14, at 127. Laudan, Kuhn, and van Frassen would
object to Kitcher's realism but then offer accounts of scientific progress. Many "contemporary
sociologists of knowledge, Bloor, Barnes, Collins, Shapin, Latour, Pickering, and others...
surely find [Kitcher's] account of progress incredible." Id. Hull contrasted extemalists who
emphasize influential social factors with internalists who highlight reason, argument, and
evidence. HUL, supra note 14, at 10-11. Some externalists, however, adopt a realist orienta-
tion, and differences of opinion exist among internalists. Laudan "is as unhappy with traditional
realist philosophers of science as relativists are." Id. Therefore, "[a]mong those who study
science, there is as much intragroup conflict as intergroup conflict, possibly more." Id. at 11.
The terms "intergroup" and "intragroup" suggest that there are groups in conflict - externalists
vs. internalists, realists vs. social constructivists - but also tremendous diversity on each side.
Most importantly, the turn away from traditional positivist accounts of scientific rationality is
not necessarily a turn to some version of social constructivism. Giere's representationalism,
supra note 14, Mayo's work in probability theory, supra note 14, and Hull's evolutionary
account of scientific progress, supra note 14, serve as examples.
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not imply that scientific models do not represent reality20 or that scientific
knowledge is constructed without regard to interactions with nature.21 For
example, some of the major scholars in the field, without giving up on their
effort to account for the social aspects of and influence on science, also are
accounting for the ways in which "reality" resists some constructions and
stabilizes others.' Many view the clear distinction between nature and society
as a false dualism that gets in the way of a workable account of science."
From an interdisciplinary perspective, therefore, law's recent engagement
with the history, philosophy, and sociology of science is impoverished and
limited to importing a simplistic version of an old debate that has since been
enriched by contributions from numerous disciplines.
Why do we continue to speak of two views of science? Several explana-
tions come to mind. First; there is the usual necessity, especially in law, to
reduce complex debates and highly contested fields of inquiry for purposes of
discourse and evaluation. In legal disputes, we are accustomed to having two
sides in conflict - one can be rejected in favor of the other. Second, we can
use the debates in other disciplines rhetorically in legal argument, perhaps to
show that law is out of step with the "new" or dominant view in another
discipline, or even to highlight that the disarray of another discipline is of
little use in law. Finally, we want to appropriate relevant interdisciplinary
knowledge without letting the other disciplines' internal debates undercut our
borrowings. In short; our characterization of another discipline needs to be
simplified for use in legal understanding and argument.
An analogy to the use in law of interdisciplinary insights about the nature
of scientific activity might be the use in literary studies of textual scholarship.
Textual scholars use various methods, partly scientific and partly rhetorical,
to "establish" a literary text from its various sources.24 A literary scholar who
wants to study or teach a particular text needs an answer, the text, not an
unending debate about all the problems of textual scholarship. The field of
textual scholarship is problematic and controversial, but to avoid getting lost
in its details one looks for the bottom line, the best construction of a text. The
20. See generally GIERE, supra note 14. Giere wrote:
One wonders whether there is not a middle way .... The winning combination, I
suggest, is one that gives up the search for criteria of scientific rationality, abandons
the attempt to separate the content and methods of science from psychological and
sociological reality, but preserves the view of science as a representational activity.
Id. at 44.
21. See generally ROUSE, supra note 10.
22. See supra note 18.
23. See, e.g., ROUSE, supra note 10, at 148-49 (discussing "natural world" as opposed to
"social world").
24. See generally D.C. Greetham, Textual Forensics, 111 PMLA32 (1996).
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situation in textual scholarship is not unlike the study of scientific activity
insofar as the field is a highly complex debate among numerous academic
competitors, and it is hard to find a dominant viewpoint. It is, however, easy
to see that almost all of the positions in the field are critical of the traditional
view of science as an objective activity that confirms theories and thereby
accumulates knowledge. Thus, law constructs a story about the discipline of
science studies. There are two views, the old and the new, but in law we want
the new.
The authors ofthe most influential amicus briefs inDaubert could there-
fore represent to the Court that the traditional view was old-fashioned and that
everybody basically holds the new view nowadays. Critics of junk science
might want a return to an old view, but serious scholars, who studied science
inthe 1970s, adopted a new view. Supposedly, not much has changed since.'
Justice Blackmun then could observe that science is an uncertain enterprise,
implying that novel theories may eventually replace the established theories
of mainstream science.26 Scholars seemingly accepted the "new" view of
science, and the Court went on the describe the characteristics of science.'
Interestingly, the new view adopted by the Court is a bit of late 1970s
criticism from the history and philosophy of science combined with a fairly
conservative commitment to traditional views of science. There is, for exam-
ple, the Court's concession that science is uncertain. Practicing scientists
admit that; however, it is hardly a critique of the scientific establishment.'
While concluding that novel, unpublished science is often good, the Court
also seems to suggest that good, unpublished science is rare." Finally, the
Court praised the adversary system as an arbiter of scientific disputes, and
25. See Brian Leiter, The Epistemology ofAdmirribilit: Why Even Good Philosophy of
Science Would NotMakefor Good Philosophy ofEvidence, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 809-12
(1997) (noting "unfortunate impression" in law schools that "Kuhn... marks the last important
development in post-positivist philosophy of science"). "[C]ontemporary philosophers of
science do not speak univocally, to be sure, but if anything is characteristic of their work, it is
that the vast majority... repudiate the Kubuian conception of science" that became popular in
the 1970s. Id. at 811-12.
26. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,590 (1993) (stating science
is uncertain); id. at 593 (stating publication not dispositive); id. at 597 (stating authentic innova-
tions might not be admitted in court, which implies that mainstream science might be wrong).
27. See id. at 592-95.
28. See Robert Boyd, The Tussle for Truth: Why Science Always Seems to Be Fraught
with Uncertainties, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 28,1997, F8 (quoting Nobel Prize-winning chemist
John Polanyi: "[Having wrong ideas, as we often do, is a necessary part of the process of
having right ones"). Scientists "work by trial and error" and "upset old dogmas and establish
new ones." Id.
29. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 ("Some propositions... are too... new... to be
published. But submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of 'good
science' ....").
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although this might seem to be a critique of the institutions of mainstream
science as non-neutral arbiters of good science, no doubt is cast on the activity
of science on its own turf. Justice Blackmun is simply contrasting the court-
room with the laboratory in how knowledge is obtained.3" We are left with a
traditional list of characteristics of science, slightly tempered with a nod to theinsights of 1970s history and philosophy of science." In post-Daubert juris-
prudence, the traditional view is further tempered by the observation that not
all good science will have all of the traditional characteristics.32 This flexibil-
ity devolves into a pragmatic use of the characteristics of science as "factors"
that help a trial judge assess scientific evidence.
In Daubert, the Court did not really adopt the traditional view as a legal
standard, and the progressive view was so il-defined that it could not serve
as any sort of standard. The new view seemingly included all possible philo-
sophical, historical, and sociological insights about the limitations on scien-
tific activity, whether they be theoretical presuppositions, social and political
influences, inexact instrumentation, or scientific fraud. Some ofthese insights
were probably influential in Daubert, but in the end the Court almost brack-
eted the question of the nature of science as unanswerable. The science we
get is sometimes biased toward established theories and is often uncertain.
Whether or not science eventually gets things right is beside the point, how-
ever, because courts need science now. Nevertheless, through the adversary
system and a judge who will keep out really bad science, courts will let one
side win in a sort of legal construction of science. Indeed, the suggestion in
Daubert that admitting scientific testimony does not mean that it is correct3
is almost celebrated by some lower federal courts.34 Such a view does not
reflect a deference to science that the critics of junk science wanted, but
neither is it a critique of science as a social construction and an historical
affair. Rather, it is an avoidance tactic with respect to the complexities ofthe
history, philosophy, and sociology of science.
If the Daubert Court were to have genuinely engaged in the debates over
the nature of science, the very first insight imported would be that there are
not two views of the nature of science in the field. The instability of the field
might have led the Court to appreciate the difficulty in defining science and
30. See id. at 596-97.
31. See id. at 593-94 (stating that science is testable, published, generally accepted knowl-
edge produced by methodology with low rate of error).
32. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999) ("[W]e conclude that
the trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about
determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable.").
33. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 598 (1993) (referring to
shaky but admissible evidence).
34. See infra Part VII.B.
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to understand why its definition of science was doomed to become not a
standard but a flexible list of factors. Decades ago, historians, philosophers,
and sociologists debunked the traditional view of science precisely because
it did not adequately describe science. 5 More recently, after historicist and
social constructivist approaches became popular, many have reacted against
the social and historical tarn (though not by returning to traditional positiv-
ism).36 Therefore, the "new" view is not a unified but a complex debate over
how to best account for science's uncertainty and institutionalized bias while
acknowledging science's power and success.
The second insight from the field is that stable insights are hard to come
by. A third insight from seriously engaging the field of studies of science is
that the troubling debate over whether science is explainable by reference to
nature or to society is best viewed as another trap.37 While holders of the
traditional view tended to ignore social influences, some early critics tended
to overemphasize the social context and, in order to distance themselves from
the traditionalists, to view all facts as social constructs. This trap - this sense
that one must decide between viewing science as grounded in nature and
reality versus viewing science as a social production grounded in belief,
representation, and rhetoric - has actually functioned within the field of
studies of science to renew and revitalize the effort to explain scientific power
and progress. Unfortunately, for those outside the field, like lawyers and legal
scholars, the trap functions as a barrier to any serious consideration of what
is happening in studies of science. Whenever the history, philosophy, and
sociology of science is viewed solely as a debate between realists and social
constructionists or between those who believe in nature and those who view
nature as a social construct, serious engagement with the field no longer
appears to be worth the effort. Some other representation of the field is
necessary before the history, philosophy, and sociology of science can be a
rich source of interdisciplinary insights for law.
In summary, the persistent problem in defining the scientific enterprise
is whether science describes or deals in nature and reality. While "most scien-
fists, most members of the public, and some historians and philosophers of
science" think so, the least reflection on science reveals limitations on scien-
tific access to nature and reality due, for example, to current theoretical
models, institutional arrangements, innovation in instrumentation and mea-
35. See GE1m, supra note 14, at 4 ("[T]he very categories in which the Enlightenment
view of science was formulated are inadequate to capture the actual practice of science, both
historically and in its contemporary forms."); LAUDAN, supra note 14, at 3 ("[Tihe positivists
had mistaken ideas... about the solutions to certain prominent problems."); RouSE, supra note
10, at 1 (referring to "widely perceived failures of the positivist/empiricist program").
36. See Callebaut, supra note 9, at 11-13.
37. See BER IN, supra note 10, at 16.
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surement, and so forth.38 Whether those limitations are viewed as accidental
and tentative limitations to be overcome in science or as constitutive and
inevitable parts of science roughly determines the way science will be defined.
That is what the so-called "science wars" are about. On one side are those
who challenge the notion that science represents nature, including historians
who document paradigm shifts (and imply that contemporary science is 'just
another paradigm" to be overthrown), sociologists who trace social determi-
nants of scientific progress, anthropologists who view science as "just an-
other" cultural practice, and literary scholars who emphasize the rhetorical
and textual aspects of science. Each ofthese views tends to denigrate the role
of nature. On the other side are those scientifically-minded who are threat-
ened by such studies and who argue that the historical, cultural, and linguistic
aspects of science are secondary and do not prevent access to nature. 9
As we have emphasized, the most interesting developments in the history,
philosophy, and sociology of science involve accounts of how science is both
naturalistic, or at least representational of natural reality, and social. Unfortu-
nately, however, all we have are competing accounts. The best represent care-
ful consideration of how scientific judgments arise out of and are dependent
upon a history of rhetorical and experimental conventions, scientific commu-
nities, evolving technologies of measurement and instrumentation, and the
biases and cognitive capacities of individual scientists. Accounts that fail to
consider the influence of such "factors" often are considered reductionistic
nowadays, but such factors can be acknowledged and then viewed as "inter-
nal" to science to avoid the implication that scientific inquiry is driven by
social, not natural, phenomena. Accounts that fail to consider the naturalistic
or representational aspect of science are likewise considered reductionistic
nowadays because the social factors are viewed as "external" determinants of
science. But science can be conceived as a co-production of social and natural
forces to avoid the implication that science has nothing to do with natural
reality. It is sometimes difficult to see how a "co-production" theory is differ-
ent from the acknowledgment of "internal" social factors. Both are efforts to
avoid reductionism, but in the former the distinction between unavoidable
internal practices and avoidable external influences breaks down. Both,
however, explain the limitations and uncertainties of science in response to
concerns about how science might be characterized.
In the next section, we discuss how Daubert and its progeny reveal
several different judicial perspectives on the philosophy of science.
38. GIERE, supra note 14, at 1.
39. See Daniel Lee Kleinman, Why Science and ScientistsAre Under Fire - and How the
Profession Needs to Respond, CHRON. HIGHEREDUC., Sept. 29,1995, at B1-2.
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1L. Two Unavoidable Things to Avoid
But I do not think [the gatekeeping responsibility] imposes
on [judges] either the obligation or the authority to become
amateur scientists ....
To reach this conclusion [udges] do not have to become
philosophers of science and set forth the necessary and
sufficient conditions of "real" science.
4'
Justice Rehnquist's concern in Daubert about amateur judicial scientists
has been eclipsed by the necessities of Daubert hearings on admissibility of
expert scientific testimony.
While meticulous Daubert inquiries may bring judges under criticism for
donningwhite coats and making determinations that are outside theirfield
of expertise, the Supreme Court has obviously deemed this less objection-
able than dumping a barrage of questionable scientific evidence on ajury,
who would likely be even less equipped than the judge....
Even on remand, in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals's second Daubert
opinion, Judge Kozinski took a "deep breath" and proceeded with the "heady
task" of resolving "disputes among respected, well-credentialed scientists about
matters clearly within their expertise. 4" Judges "who do not have a scientific
background (and most do not)" must "do the best they can" to decide "whether
a scientist's testimony is real science or not."' Indeed, the first impression that
arises after reading a stack of lengthy post-Daubert federal court opinions is
that judges take seriously their gatekeeping role. Rather than appearing baf-
fled, judges demonstrate new-found familiarity with scientific evidence from
various fields.45 Disagreements, of course, occasionally arise as appellate
panels produce divided opinions46 or find that a trialjudge was too restrictive47
40. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600-01 (1993) (Rehnquist, I.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
41. Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996).
42. Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F3d 1300,1310 (11th Cir. 1999).
43. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F3d 1311,1316 (9th Cir. 1995).
44. Rosen, 78 F.3d at 318.
45. Daubert requires judges to come to terms with the scientific method. In the past
"[t]he principal failing in the legal system's approach to scientific evidence has been courts'
unwillingness to grapple with the basics of the scientific method." David L. Faigman et al.,
Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Pas4 Understanding
the Presen; and WonyingAbout the Future ofScientific Evidence, 15 CARDoZo L. REV. 1799,
1823 (1994).
46. See, e.g., Greenwellv. Boatwright, 184 F.3d 492,449 (6th Cir. 1999).
47. See, e.g.,In re Paoli R.. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717,760 (3d Cir. 1994) (revers-
ing trial court's decision); Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129,131 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same).
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or too lenient.4 White coats are donned nevertheless with regularity and even
with some success.
On the other hand, it is not so clear whether judges should don the "tweed"
coat of the philosopher of science. Judge Posner thinks not:
When the Supreme Court in Daubert told judges to distinguish between
real and courtroom science, it was not with the object of discovering the
essence of "science," if there is such an essence. The object ... was to
make sure that when scientists testify in court they adhere to the same
standards of intellectual rigor that are demanded in their professional
work.49
And yet, when Judge Posner goes on to say that such scientists' evidence is
"admissible even if the particular methods they have used in arriving at their
opinion are not yet accepted as canonical,"' 0 the vague contours of a philoso-
phy of science begin to appear. Posner has already distinguished between real
"mainstream" or "canonical" science, real "novel" science based on unique
methods, and courtroom or "bad" science. While Posner has perhaps not
become a philosopher of science because he is concerned only with evaluating
science in the context of litigation, he is reflecting on science in abstraction
from the particulars of the case before him in order to establish a framework
for his evidentiary assessment. That is what Justice Blackmun was doing in
Daubert, and as numerous commentators have pointed out, he was "doing"
philosophy of science."'
In what sense, then, can judges avoid a philosophy of science? One
possible answer is that, by following Daubert, judges are adopting its philoso-
phy of science. For various reasons, however, Daubert serves badly as a
philosophical account of scientific activity. Depending on how one reads
Daubert, one might conclude that there is no clear philosophy of science in
the opinion, 2 or that the philosophy of science presented is not a good one,"3
or even that two conflicting philosophies of science are in play, rendering the
philosophical contribution incoherent.' Our view is that the Daubert guide-
lines and general observations about science are ambiguous enough to permit
48. See, e.g., Brock v. Caterpillar, Inc., 94 F.3d 220,225 (6th Cir. 1996) (reversing trial
court's decision).
49. Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316,318 (7th Cir. 1996).
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Farrell, supra note 17, at 2185 ("[T]wo generalized epistemological posi-
tions ... in Daubert."); Imwinkelried, supra note 7, at 65 (noting Justice Blackmun's adoption
of modem philosophy of science).
52. This is our view, as explained infra Part IM.
53. See, e.g., Mansfield, supra note 17, at 12.
54. See, e.g., Farrell, supra note 17, at 2198,2207 (discussing incoherent adoption oftwo
"world views").
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various philosophical positions on science and that those positions are repre-
sented in various post-Daubert federal court opinions. Moreover, we believe
that taking a philosophical position, whether or not acknowledged or expli-
cated, is inevitable.
To say that judges do not have to become philosophers of science follow-
ing Daubert is a bit like saying a federal judge can avoidbecoming a constitu-
tional theorist. While it is certainly true that a judge may not be interested in
all of the scholarly debates about constitutional interpretation, it would be
naive to presume that a judge can avoid taking a position on how to read the
Constitution. When a judge decides a constitutional case without identifying
himself or herself as belonging to a particular school of constitutional theory,
commentators stand ready to classify the judge's approach. Similarly, while
there is virtually no discussion about the debates in the history and philosophy
of science in post-Daubert opinions concerning expert testimony, judges
cannot avoid adopting a perspective on scientific activity. There is a differ-
ence, for example, between a judge who emphasizes taking a "hard look" at
the "testimony ofpaid experts" to "detect and exclude junk science" that "may
creep into the courtroom"55 and a judge who stresses that a gatekeeper is not
an "armed guard." For the latter,
Daubert neither requires nor empowers trial courts to determine which of
several competing scientific theories has the bestprovenance. It demands
only that the proponent of the evidence show that the expert's conclusion
has been arrived at in a scientifically sound and methodologically reliable
fashion.'
Both perspectives find quotational support inDaubert, butthe Daubert guide-
lines are framed differently.
Our argument - that a judge's perspective on science will affect his or
her decisions on admissibility of scientific testimony - will seem to many
readers uncontroversial. After all, the notion that judges are not objective is
commonplace. Consider the recently published book review sarcastically
entitled News Flash: Judges are Ideologically Motivated The scientific
enterprise, however, is supposed to provide stable insights for law, rendering
a judge's philosophical or ideological inclinations largely irrelevant to his or
her evaluation (under Daubert) of scientific reliability.5" Nevertheless, a
55. Greenwell v. Boatwright, 184 F.3d 492, 501 (6th Cir. 1999) (Merritt, 3., dissenting).
56. Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77,85 (1stCir. 1998).
57. See generally Robert M. Griffin, News Flash: Judges Are Ideologically Motivated,
26 AU J. CRIM. L. 395 (1999) (reviewing SUSAN U. PniuPS, IDEOLOGYIN THE LANGUAGE OF
JUDGES: How JuDaEs PRAcTicE LAW, POIXICS, AND COURTROOM CONTROL (1999)).
58. But see Redding & Reppucci, supra note 11 (finding trial judges' evidentiary rulings
on socially controversial evidence biased by their own sociopolitical opinions).
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position on science is unavoidable, and judicial assessments of scientific
reliability after Daubert reflect influential philosophies of science.
To understand how a court's use of Daubert reveals a philosophical
perspective on science, we might first emphasize that interdisciplinary
borrowings from philosophy are characterized best as perspectives or beliefs,
not as stable knowledge. With only slight exaggeration, D.M. Armstrong has
remarked that "[p]hilosophy.. . contains no knowledge at all" and is more like
religion than commonsense or science.59 When taking a philosophical posi-
tion, one needs to
rememberthatpeoplewho arejust asbright asus, insomeinstancesbrighter,
have studied the same material, considered the same arguments, and have
cometothe opposite conclusiontous. This should giveus epistemic pause.
... [While] I believe that in philosophy we should all "fight for our
comer" and arguevigorouslyfor ourpoint ofview, we should also practice
a moderate and mitigated scepticism and remain conscious of the more or
less serious difficulties our own position is sure to face.'
Turning to the philosophy of science, conceived as the effort to give founda-
tional accounts of scientific inquiry and practice, Armstrong's deflationary
modesty seems appropriate. There is no single philosophy of science to be
understood and adopted, but rather a choice of positions, each representing a
different account of science. Joseph Rouse, for example, identified four major
traditions in 20th Century philosophical discussions of science, including:
(1) the logical empiricist and Popperian program, (2) historical rationalism,
(3) scientific realism, and (4) social constructivism.1 Ronald Giere likewise
59. D.M. Annstrong,A NaturalistProgram: Epistemology and Ontology, 73 PRoCEED-
INGS &ADDRESSES OF THEAPA, No. 2,77,79 (1999) (containing text of 11 thAnnual Romancli
Lecture on Philosophical Naturalism).
60. Id. at 82,89.
61. ROUSE, supra note 10, at 8. Rouse stated that, "[flor the logical positivists and for
Popper, . . . the legitimating features of scientific knowledge were to provide a principled
demarcation of the boundaries of science and of empirical knowledge more generally." Id. He
continued:
Their successors... still frame global arguments to address questions of legitima-
tion. Scientific realists... argue that... the best explanation for the instrumental
success of [a mature science's] theory-dependant methods is the approximate truth
of its theories.... The historical rationalist tradition may seem to move away from
such global interpretations of science .... But [many] still develop general histori-
ographical frameworks that situate the history of any particular scientific discip-
fine... in order to assess the legitimacy of its achievements .... [Social construc-
tivists contend that] all scientific beliefs must be accounted for by social factors,
[and that] any adequate interpretation of scientific knowledge claims must be
neutral with respect to their epistemic or political legitimacy and hence to that
extent [are] committed to some form ofepistemic relativism.
Id. at 8-9.
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contrasted: (1) logical empiricism and functionalist sociology of science,
(2) Kuhnian paradigm theory, (3) post-Kulmian historical schools and views
of science as a social construct, (4) evolutionary models, and (5) models based
on cognitive mechanisms.62 Significantly, Rouse and Giere each identified
these traditions as a prelude to his own view, which is not quite captured in
these traditions. Rouse's cultural studies approach can be seen as a revision
of social constructivism, while Giere's view can be seen as a reaction against
social constructivism. Numerous other accounts compete to summarize the
complex debates inthe history, philosophy, and sociology of science,63 but we
only wish to emphasize that there are various positions in the field and that all
of them have contemporary adherents.
IV Philosophies of Science in Daubert
Whenever judges begin to talk about the features of scientific validity,
they will inevitably begin to stake out a position among the various philoso-
phies of science that attempt to give a compelling account of how science
works. We might summarize the last forty years in the history, philosophy,
and sociology of science as a series of acknowledgments of the "social"
aspects of science, together with a series of reactions against what are per-
ceived to be excesses of the "social turn," both in contrast to the naive under-
62. See GIERE, supra note 14, at 33 (stating that for logical empiricists, science has
properties of being both "representational and rational" and leaving "an unbridgeable gap
between the content and methods of science and all other aspects, such as psychology of
scientists or their social organization"); id. at 33-34 (stating that Robert Merton's functionalist
sociology of science took "for granted that the function of science is to produce 'certified
knowledge,'" when he "renounced any role for the sociologist in analyzing the content of this
knowledge or the methods by which it became certified;" sociologist's role is "complimentary
to that of the logical empiricist philosopher of science"); id. at 37 (stating that Kuhn explained
that at "any point in a stage of normal science there will always be anomalies" that can lead to
crisis, which can then lead "to the proliferation of new approaches" and revolutionary overthrow
of old paradigm in favor of "new" normal science); id. at 41 (following Kuhn, "there arose
within the philosophy of science a 'historical school' [that] retained the earlier philosophical
goal of showing how the development of science could be, if not progressing toward truth, at
least objectively 'rational'"); id. at 43 (stating that alternative to Merton has developed in
sociology which "portrays science as being nonrepresentational, nonrational, and lacking any
fundamental separation between content and methods, and social structure"); id. at 46, 54
(stating that for evolutionary models of science, theories are "embodied in people and their
artifacts, both abstract and material," thus scientists, not theories, are "basic individuals in a
theory of science," individual scientists, together with their ideas, are "selected from a popula-
tion exhibiting considerable variation"), id. at 49 (stating that models based on cognitive
mechanisms supplement evolutionary models by accounting for "the mechanisms underlying
the analogous processes of variation, selection, and transmission").
63. See generally GALUSON, supra note 18 (discussing history of physics and various
views as to how theories emerge from laboratories), PoTrr, supra note 18 (discussing different
accounts of science).
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standing of science as an exclusively empirical, experiential, or observational
affair. We can further identify two extreme positions regarding science that
are, for purposes of understanding the use of science in law, basically irrele-
vant. First, the notions that science is made up of indubitable "knowledge of
the immediately given,"' reports of experience in "an unbroken, cumulative
language of observation,"'65 or appeals to "direct sensory experience - and
nothing else"'66 are generally viewed as the outdated fantasy of logical positiv-ism. Neither Daubert nor the more influential briefs submitted in that case
relied on such a picture of science. Second, the interesting notion that science
is "totally constituted by human interests and interactions"67 and involves no
"causal interaction with the world"' is of little use to courts evaluating
scientific validity. In between those extremes lies the complicated project of
identifying the "social" aspects of science, which includes all non-empirical
or non-observational features of science whether related to the presuppositions
and capacities of individual scientists or to the values and practices of scien-
tific communities and institutions.
The most obvious and uncontroversial "social" factor is the influence of
theoretical presuppositions on perception, selection and design of experi-
ments, and data collection and analysis.69 Other factors include, with some
64. PETER GAUSoN, IMAGE AND LoGic: A MATERIAL CULTURE oF MicRopmmSics 784
(1997).
65. Id.
66. GmRE, supra note 14, at32.
67. Id. at 43.
68. Id. at45.
69. See generally Richard E. Redding, Reconstructing Science Through Law, 23 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 585 (1999). Scientists are by no means immune from being swayed by their own
passions and personal and political agendas. According to Michael Rein:
The scientist is often saliently illogical in his work, particularly when he is defend-
ing a preferred view or attacking a rival one; [i]n his experimental research,,he is
often selective, expedient, and not immune to distorting the data; [t]he scientist is
probably the most passionate of the professionals; his theoretical and personal
biases often color his alleged "openness" to the data.... He is not the paragon of
humility or disinterest but is, instead, often a selfish, ambitious, and petulant
defender of personal recognition and territoriality, f]ar from being a "suspender of
judgment," the scientist is often an impetuous truth spinner who rushes to hypothe-
ses and theories long before the data would warrant.
MICHAEL REIN, SociAL ScmNcE AND PuBuc Poucy 6 (1976). These assertions are supported
by the following observations of scientists at work.
A senior investigator insists that her assistants use theory X rather than theory Y to
interpret their findings.... Investigators demonstrate the weaknesses in theory and
method of all those who oppose their position, but do not admit their own short-
comings.... Investigators cite favorably those who were likely to review their
work for publication, hoping to increase the chances that their own work will be
published - that is, viewed as "accepted truth."
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overlap, the cognitive capacities of individual scientists, the training, indoctri-
nation, and professionalization of scienists, political and personal values and
interests, rhetorical conventions and negotiation techniques, availability of
material resources, institutional support and restraints, and even cultural and
gender bias."' The empirical and observational activities of science are thus
influenced, contextualized, or limited by these psychological, institutional,
microsocial, and macrosocial mechanisms. The degree to which social factors
interfere with empirical science or, in the converse formulation, the degree to
which the natural world resists scientific theory and practice, is a matter of
never-ending debate in the history, philosophy, and sociology of science.
If we eliminate the extreme positions in the debate as overreactions -
(1) those who "imply that science is beyond politics and values, that it is an
enterprise driven solely by norms of objectivity and rigor" (an obvious overre-
action to social critics of science), 1 and (2) those sociologists of science who
deny "the individual any role at all" and who hold that "reality has nothing to do
with what we say of it" (an obvious overreaction to individualism and real-
ism) 2 - a rich debate remains as to how to characterize science. The distinc-
tions between positions, however, become more nuanced and sophisticated,
having less to do with the recognition of the social aspects of science than with
the conclusions to be drawn from that recognition. In the end, do you trust
science and acknowledge its epistemological superiority, or do you become
skeptical and question its status as a producer of"tuth" in culture and law?
Consider, for example, the acknowledgments by scientists that science
is full of inconsistencies and wrong ideas,"3 that some scientific methods are
arbitrary, 4 that the institutions of science are political," that some scientific
KENNTH J. GERGEN, TH SATUATD SEL: DIEM OFIDMTYINCONTMXORARYLI
93 (1991) (citing BRUNO LATOUR & STEvE WOOLGAP, LABORATORY LIFE: TBE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTs (1979)). For a defense of scientific progress and an
explanation of its successes in knowledge production notwithstanding interested actors, see
HULL, supra note 14, at 354-96.
70. See supra note 69.
71. Kleinman, supra note 39, atB2.
72. Barry Barnes,HowNottoDo the Sociology of Knowledge, in RETEINNG OBJECTIV-
nT28,31 (Allan Megill ed., 1994).
73. See Boyd, supra note 28, at F8 (acknowledging science is full of wrong ideas).
74. See Michael Scriven, Methods of Reasoning and Justification in Social Science and
Law, 23 J. LEGALEDUC. 189, 197-99 (1970) (arguing that scientific methods often are arbitrary
and that science and law use equally arbitrary methods of reasoning). The rules of statistical
significance provide a good example of the arbitrariness in scientific discourse. See generally
Sandra Scarr, Rules ofEvidence: A Larger Contextfor the StatisticalDebate, 8 PSYCHOL. SCL
16 (1997) (stating that scientific institutions are political).
75. See HESS, supra note 5, at 2 ("Scientists have come to recognize the political nature
of the institutions of science, and their research problems have become increasingly tied to
public and private agendas outside their disciplines."). See generally TBEODORE M. PORTER,
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studies are deceptive,76 that science cannot exist without a "gatekeeping"
reward system and authority structure, 7 and that some of our leading scien-
fists are wrong.7" For some, these acknowledgments are not challenges to the
superiority of science, but mere bumps in the road. Wrong ideas beget right
ideas, institutional bias can be eliminated, deceptive studies can be identified,
"gatekeeping" produces good science, and disagreements are healthy. For
others, these acknowledgments confirm that science is always a cultural
activity," that agendas are "hidden behind a rhetoric of objectivity, '"8  and that
scientific certainty rests problematically on a network of individual and social
interests, powerful elites, and a trusting public."' In the former view, lawyers
should pay attention to mainstream science and let it control our courts. In the
latter view, law needs to control science. 
2
TRUSTiNNUMBERS: ThmPuRsroFOB3EcIvrlTyNSCENCEANDP BrCLFE211-12 (1995)
(stating scientific institutions are political).
76. See Daniel S. Greenberg, Turning Science into Gold, WASH. POST, Nov. 30,1999, at
A29 ("Journal of the American Medical Association... concluded that favorable results [of a
series of drug tests] were puffed up through repetitions in various publications, while negative
information was played down or ignored.").
77. See David Goodstein & James Woodward, Inside Science, AM. SCHOLAR, Autumn
1999, at 90 (concluding science aims to discover truths about world and that reward system and
authority structure serve to produce useful results).
78. See, e.g., Robert Wright, The Accidental Creationist, NEW YORKER, Dec. 13,1999,
at 56-65 (criticizing Stephen Jay Gould's evolutionary theory as wrong and as unwittingly
helpful to creationists).
79. See Richard Levins, Ten Propositions on Science and Antiscience, 46-47 SOCIAL
Txr 101, 103-04 (1996) (describing science's dual nature). Levins proposed that
[s]cience has a dual nature. On the one hand, it really does enlighten us about our inter-
actions with the rest ofthe world, producing understanding and guiding our actions ....
On the other hand, as a product of human activity, science reflects the conditions
of its production and the viewpoints of its producers or owners. The agenda of science,
the recruitment and training of some and the exclusion of others from being scientists,
the strategies of research, the physical instruments of investigation, the intellectual
framework in which problems are formulated and results interpreted, the criteria for a
successful solution to a problem, and the conditions of application of scientific results
are all very much a product of the history ofthe sciences and associated technologies and
of the societies that form and own them. The pattern of knowledge and ignorance in
science is not dictated by nature but is structured by interest and belief.
Id. See generally ScIENCE As PRACTICE AD CLTuRE (Andrew Pickering ed., 1992).
80. HESS, supra note 5, at 1; see also D. MeCloskey, The EssentialRhetoric ofLaw, Lit-
erature, andLiberty, 5 CRTcALREv. 203,219 (1991) ("The legal and literary style of reason-
ing is already how scientists argue. The official descriptions and surface rhetoric of science
obscure the fact, but fact it is.").
81. See BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN 1-9 (C. Porter trans., 1993)
(arguing that scientific facts are simultaneously real, collective, and discursive).
82. See generaly Richard E. Redding, How Common-Sense Psychology Can Inform Law
and PsycholegalResearch, 5 U. CIM L. Scnz ROUNDTABLE 107 (1998); Redding, supra note 69,
JUNK PHILOSOPHY OFSCIENCE?
We might now ask what position the Daubert Court took in this debate.
Did the Court acknowledge the social aspects of science, and to what degree?
Just as important, what is the picture of science that develops in lower federal
courts following Daubert? Re-reading Daubert with these questions in mind,
the opinion can be divided into three phases. First; the Court explained that
the district court granted respondent Merrell Dow's motion for summary
judgment based on Dr. Lamm's review of "more than 30 published studies
involving over 130,000 patients" and on his conclusion that no study showed
Bendectin could cause birth defects. 3 Petitioner's own eight experts con-
cluded otherwise, but their testimony was found not to be admissible because
it was not "sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the field.1
8 4
Petitioner's experts' analyses and re-analyses, the district court found, had not
been published or subjected to peer review, and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed that expert opinion that diverges "significantly from the
procedures accepted by recognized activities in the field" is not generally
accepted as reliable. 5 Relying on Frye v. United States,ss the court of appeals
found unpublished re-analyses "particularly problematic in light of the mas-
sive weight of the original published studies.""7
The second phase of the opinion rejects Frye in favor of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, emphasizing Rule 402's liberal standard of relevance and
the absence of "general acceptance" as a standard in Rule 702.8 The Court
highlighted the separation of science from law by mentioning law's reliance
on "lawyer adversaries and sensible triers of fact to evaluate conflicts."8 9 As
if that standard might let anything in, the Court confirmed that judges are to
screen evidence to ensure it is reliable, methodologically sound, and based on
good grounds.' Even in this second phase of the opinion, the Court began to
at 598-601 (arguingthat common-sense psychology inherent in law can inform social science, and
providing examples where social science has lagged law's behavioral assumptions). Law often
influences the course of scientific progress. See Mike RedmayneExpertEvidence and Scienific
Disagreement, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1027,1071-75 (1997) (providing examples showing how
litigation involving scientific issues prompts additional scientific research and controversy).
83. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,582-83 (1993).
84. Id. at 583 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 572
(S.D. Cal. 1989) (quoting United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978))).
85. Id. at584 (quotingDaubertv.MerrellDowPharms.,Inc.,951 F.2d 1128,1130 (9th
Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522,1526 (9th Cir. 1985))).
86. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923) (introducing general acceptance
test).
87. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 584 (quoting Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1130).
88. See id. at 585-92.
89. Id. at 589 (quoting Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence Is Sound;
It Should NotBeAmended, 138 F.R.D. 631,632 (1991)).
90. See id. at 589-90.
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define and discuss characteristics of the scientific enterprise: "[T]here are no
certainties in science" - science does not represent "what is immutably 'true,"'
but rather is a "process for proposing and refining" theories?1 The implica-
tion, of course, is that some theories may turn out to be wrong, so courts
should admit all relevant expert testimony that follows the scientific method,
rather than defer to majoritarian views of expertise among scientists as the
lower court did in Daubert.
The third phase of the opinion 2 defines science in a series of "general
observations" that have become the four-part test for admission of scientific
evidence: (1) scientific knowledge is testable (or refutable, or fusifiable);
(2) it is usually subject to peer review and published, though not always (since
some "propositions... are too particular, too new, or of too limited interest");
(3) as to particular scientific techniques, the error rate should be considered;
and finally, (4) "general acceptance" remains a factor - though not required,
a known technique unable to attract support may be viewed with skepticism.'
Notice that the first and third factors (which involve a definition of science
based on the scientific method), testability and an acceptable rate of error, are
unqualified and appear to establish a benchmark of scientific validity.
The second and fourth factors, on the other hand, are established as useful
but not determinative, confirming that publication in peer-reviewed journals
and general acceptance would be inappropriate considerations for novel
scientific theories.94 This flexibility leads to the conclusion that Daubert is
less deferential to the scientific establishment than Frye was even though the
Court also acknowledged a concern that judicial screening of evidence "will
sanction a stifling and repressive scientific orthodoxy."' Instead of stressing
that the four factors are less deferential to scientific orthodoxy, the Court
distinguished science, which considers multiple hypotheses, from law, which
has no time for "conjectures that are probably wrong" and in which "authentic
insights and innovations" might be rejected to resolve a dispute quickly.96 That
response to the concern over repressive scientific orthodoxy is more than a bit
unsettling because earlier in the opinion the Court characterized the Rules as
91. Id. at 590 (quoting amicus brief of American Association for the Advancement
Science, at 7-8, and amicus brief of Nicolas Bloemberger et al., at 9).
92. See id. at 592-95.
93. See id. at 593-94 (defining science).
94. Note that publication in peer-reviewed journals may be necessary for general accep-
tance, but it is not sufficient. Publication "does not imply that the scientific community stands
behind the article's findings ...only that three to five scientists judged the method to be
competent and the analysis to be interesting." Robert Timothy Reagan, Relevance, Reliability,
and the Validity ofScientific Evidence, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 291,300 (1999).
95. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
96. Id. at 597.
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liberal and science as uncertain. The adversary system was supposed to be the
safeguard.' In concluding, the Daubert Court implied that novel views are
probably wrong,' without realizing that novel views often may appear to be
wrong when compared to mainstream science - that's what makes a view
"novel."" But even novel science must conform to minimally acceptable
standards and practices ofthe scientific method.
In addition to the four Daubert factors - two unqualified (testability, rate
of error) and two qualified (publication, general acceptance) - the develop-
ment of Daubert in subsequent federal court opinions subtly reveals three
interpretive principles that function inconsistently to modify Daubert stan-
dards of admissibility. The three principles, which implicitly reflect judicial
philosophies of science, can be termed (1) the flexibility principle, (2) the
methodology/conclusions distinction, and (3) the acknowledgment of conflict-
ing admissible scientific testimony. Courts following Daubert have manipu-
lated these principles to reveal that Daubert can be read more liberally and
generously, or more conservatively and restrictively, with respect to admissi-
bility of scientific testimony. The conservative approach is characterized by:
(1) making the four factors less flexible (e.g., using all four as determinative),
(2) blurring the methodology/conclusions distinction, and (3) failing to
acknowledge the possibility of conflicting, admissible scientific testimony.
Conversely, the more liberal approach is characterized by: (1) emphasizing
the flexibility, non-exclusiveness, and even the potential non-applicability of
the four factors, (2) maintaining a strong methodology/conclusions distinction,
and (3) acknowledging the possibility of conflicting, admissible scientific
testimony. After illustrating the varied operations of the three principles
(which may usefully inform practitioners about the rhetoric employed by
judges and the terms on which they must argue for a narrow versus liberal
application of Daubert), we will show that the more liberal approach is
consistent with contemporary insights from the history, philosophy, and
sociology of science, while the more conservative approach reflects an out-
dated vision of the scientific enterprise.
97. See id. at 589,596.
98. See ia at 597 ("The scientific project is advanced by broad and wide-ranging consid-
eration of a multitude of hypotheses, for those that are incorrect will eventually be shown to be
so .... Conjectures that are probably wrong are of little use, however, in the project of
reaching a quick, final, and binding legal judgment....").
99. See Koukoutochos, supra note 17, at 2252 (pointing out that Court confused "the
admissibility of evidence with the sufficiency of that evidence on the merits"). Koukoutochos
explained: "To say that exclusion from the courtroom is acceptable because an expert scientific
opinion is 'probably wrong' is to beg the question: how can a judge know, at the threshold,
without considering all the evidence, which opinions 'are probably wrong?"' Id.
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A. Flexibility: "Features" of Science Become "Factors" to Consider
First, the flexibility of the four Daubert factors was acknowledged in
Daubert itself, both in the text - the "inquiry envisioned ... is... a flexible
one" - and in a footnote:
A number of authorities have presented variations on the reliability ap-
proach, each with its own slightly different set of factors .... To the
extentthatthey focus onthe reliability of evidence as ensured bythe scien-
tific validity of its underlying principles, all these versions may well have
merit, although we express no opinion regarding any of their particular
details.1'0
Flexibility regarding the test or factors to be used, of course, does not imply
that certain factors can be ignored. InBelofskyv. GeneralElectric Co., 0 ' the
district judge read Daubert as suggesting that "a district court should take" the
four factors into account when evaluating scientific testimony, but also noted
that United States v. Downing," a Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision,
listed similar but different factors."0 ' The judge concluded that a "district
court should take into account all of the factors listed by either Daubert or
Downing as well as any others that are relevant."1" 4 However, the United
States Supreme Court, in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,05 recently re-
emphasized the flexibility of the Daubert factors:
[A] trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular
case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is
reliable. That is to say, a trial court should consider the specific factors
identified inDaubert where they are reasonable measures ofthe reliability
of expert testimony.1
6
To the extent that the Daubert factors describe the methodologies of the
"hard" sciences, but not the methodology of experts in clinical practice or non-
scientific testimony, this flexibility makes sense. However, the Court's failure
to understand the difficulty in applying the Daubert guidelines (which are
100. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95 n.12.
101. 980 F. Supp. 818 (1997).
102. 733 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
103. See Belofsky v. General Elec. Co., 980 F. Supp. 818, 821 n.2 (1997) (citing United
States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224,1238-39 (3d Cir. 1985)).
104. 'Id. (citing In re Paoli R.R. Yard PBC Litig., 35 F.3d 717,742 (3d Cir. 1994)).
105. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
106. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). Significantly, the flexi-
bility emphasized in Kumho Tire related to an engineer's testimony and responded to the
question (raised in the wake of Daubert) of whether the four Daubert factors applied to non-
scientific testimony. Nevertheless, the flexibility emphasized in Kumho Tire has not been lim-
ited to nonscientific testimony cases, as the discussion following indicates.
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based on the paradigm of the scientific method) to non-scientific testimony"°
further betrays an unwillingness to squarely face the question of what counts
as science, and whether we can "scientize" all expert testimony by transferring
principles of scientific methodology to non-scientific disciplines.
Following Kumho Tire, federal courts reiterate with regularity this new
level of flexibility, returning to the Daubert factors as a "helpful, not determi-
native," tool or frameworkl°8 emphasizing that a judge "may consider one or
more of the Daubert factors when doing so will help determine the expert's
reliability,"1 9 and observing that "the Daubert factors may not all apply even
to the admissibility of pure scientific testimony.""'
The abuse of discretion standard of review for expert testimony evalua-
tions, confirmed in General Electric Co. v. Joiner" as appropriate," 2 high-
lights the flexibility of Daubert assessments."' Indeed, Justice Stevens in his
Joiner dissent pointed out that while the majority found no abuse of discretion
in disallowing the testimony of Joiner experts, 'the court has not held that it
would have been an abuse of discretion to admit the expert's testimony.""1
4
Judge Bright, in his dissent in United States v. Waters,"' where the majority
approved the exclusion of polygraph evidence without holding a Daubert
hearing, made the same point by remarking that the court may well have
admitted the evidence under Daubert standards." 6 The abuse of discretion
107. See K. Issac DeVyver, Comment, Opening the Door But Keeping the Lights Off.
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael and the Applicability of the "Daubert" Test to Nonscientific
Evidence, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 177,193-99 (1999) ("The Newtonian method, however,
cannot ensure the reliability of nonscientific evidence.").
108. Terran v. Secretary ofHealth & Human Servs., 195 F.3d 1302,1316 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
The Daubert factors are not to be used as a "definitive checklist or test." Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,150 (1999) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phbrms., Inc., 509 U.S.
573,593 (1993)).
109. United States v. Paul, 175 F3d 906,910 (11th Cir. 1999).
110. Blackv.FoodLion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308,311 (SthCir. 1999) ("There are many kinds
of experts and expertise, [and] the Daubert inquiry is always fact-specific.").
111. 522U.S. 136(1997).
112. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 136 (1997) (stating that applying strict
abuse of discretion standard reflects preference for admissibility of evidence under Federal
Rules of Evidence).
113. See Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 83 (1st Cir. 1998)
(stating abuse of discretion standard is not ordinarily "appellant-friendly"); see also Randolph
N. Jonakait, The Standard of Appellate Review for Scientific Evidence: Beyond Joiner and
Scheffer, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 294-97, 302-03 (1999) (arguing Joiner's abuse of
discretion standard means that appellate courts will defer to judgment of trial courts concerning
scientific evidence, resulting in lack of uniformity across jurisdictions in gatekeeping function).
114. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 155 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
115. 194 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1999).
116. See United States v. Waters, 194 F.3d 926,937 (8th Cir. 1999) (Bright, J., dissenting).
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standard, which is "not appellant-friendly,"117 only adds to the flexibility of
the four Daubert factors for assessing the reliability of scientific testimony.
The four Daubert factors and the flexibility of their application empha-
sized in Kumho Tire and Joiner do not so much reflect a particular philosophy
of science as they allow various philosophies of science to remain in play in
federal courts. If ajudge is inclined to view science as "autonomous from the
rest of society in that its legitimacy and authority are grounded in universal
principles that transcend any particular social context" (Giere's definition of
"enlightenment rationalism")," Daubert provides ample aphorisms and
observations to support that view. Science is unique among "fields of human
inquiry" because of its empirical foundations, the scrutiny of the scientific
community ("a component of 'good science"'), and its "exhaustive search for
cosmic understanding.11 9 Such a judge, in exercising his or her considerable
leeway in employing the Daubert factors, might follow the hints in Daubert
that unpublished theories may have undetected "substantive flaws in method-
ology,' 2 and that theories "'able to attract only minimal support within the
community'... may properly be viewed with skepticism.
121
On the other hand, if the judge views science as a social practice charac-
terized not only by its successes but by its uncertainty and limitations, whether
due to theoretical presuppositions, selection and design of experiments, pro-
fessionalization, institutional and personal interests, or availability of material
resources, that view also finds support in Daubert. There are no certainties
in science: "[S]cientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision;" more-
over, publication or general acceptance are not always reliable warrants for
"well-grounded but innovative theories."' " Such a judge may not find the
publication and general acceptance "factors" to be "reasonable measures of
the reliability of expert testimony. "123 For example, the district court in Volk
v. United States,24 hearing an appeal from a conviction entered by a magis-
trate judge, held that the trial court did not err in failing to hold a Daubert
117. Ruiz-Troche, 161 F.3d at83 (quotingLussier v.Runyun, 50 F3d 1103,1111 (Ist Cir.
1995)).
118. GMIEE,supra note 14, at 57.
119. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593, 597 (1993). But see D.
Michael Risinger et al., Brave New ?Post-Daubert World" -A Reply to Professor Moenssens,
29 SETON HALL L. REV. 405, 436 n.99 (1998) ("Some courts mistakenly assume that science
deals only with... theories... which are directed at exploring the cosmos ... and not with
more concrete and everyday phenomenon.").
120. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
121. Id. at 594.
122. Id. at 590, 593, 597.
123. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,152 (1999).
124. 57 F. Supp. 2d 888 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
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hearing on testimony based on field sobriety tests."2 The court acknowledged
that the Daubert fhctors could be applied, but relied on Kumho Tire to con-
clude that "no mechanistic application of Daubert" is required as long as "the
record reflects an adequate consideration of the reliability of the testimony
before admitting it."'126 InAmerican Computer Innovators v. Electronic Data
Systems,2 7 the district court held a Daubert hearing regarding the testimony
of an investment consultant, finding the proffered opinion "shaky" but admis-
sible because personal experience, reasoning, and methodology were not
"purely speculative [and without] any rational basis."'" The opinion empha-
sized that the Daubert factors, "[t]he points of inquiry proposed by Justice
Blackmun," are only examples and not intended to limit the tools that might
be used by a judge to test the reliability of the proposed testimony. 29 Like-
wise, in United States v. Paul,"' a case involving admissibility of expert
handwriting analysis, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals twice referred to
the flexibility of the Daubert factors, "one or more" of which may be consid-
ered but which do not apply '"o all experts or in every case." 3' Citing Kumho
Tire, the court highlighted the "broad latitude" enjoyed by trial judges not
only with respect to reliability determinations, but also "when [each] decides
how to deternine reliability."'
132
Although the above opinions exemplify the flexibflity of Daubert with
respect to "non-scientific" testimony and the Kumho Tire guidelines, the same
level of flexibility was emphasized in In re Paoli R.R Yard PCB Litigation, 
1 33
decided just after Daubert, with respect to clinical medical testimony. 34 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals warned against setting the threshold for admis-
sibility too high in applying Daubert:
[N]o particular combination of techniques chosen by a doctor to assess an
individual patient is likely to have been generally accepted. But unlike a
methodology used in conducting a scientific study, lack of general accep-
tance is not a sign of unreliability.... Nor is it likely that the particular
combination will have been published and subject to peer review ..
125. See Volk v. United States, 57 F. Supp. 2d 888,895 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
126. Id.
127. 74 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D. Mass. 1999).
128. American Computer Innovators, Inc. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 74 F. Supp. 2d
64,68-69 (D. Mass. 1999).
129. Id. at 67.
130. 175 F.3d 906 (1 lth Cir. 1999).
131. United States v. Paul, 175 F.3d 906,910 (1 lth Cir. 1999).
132. Id. (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,142 (1999)).
133. 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).
134. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717,758 (3d Cir. 1994).
135. Id.
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Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc.,"' also involving the admissibility of clinical
medical testimony in the Third Circuit, confirmed that medical experts need
not always rely on published studies:
137
To so hold would doom from the outset all cases in which the state of
research on the specific ailment orthe alleged causal agent was in its early
stages, and would effectively resurrect a Frye-like bright-line standard...
by excluding expert testimony not backed by published (and presumably
peer-reviewed) studies."3
Without overstating the case - all the Daubert or Downing factors are to be
"considered"'139 in the Third Circuit and the expert testimony infHeller was not
viewed as admissible"4 - the framing of the Daubert factors as optional is
significant. Science is vaguely characterized in the above opinions by the
tentativeness, uncertainty, and disagreements surrounding its generally
accepted conclusions found in its peer-reviewed publications. This picture of
science is made more visible when compared to the picture in several other
federal court opinions on the admissibility of expert testimony.
In Koch v. Shell Oil Co.,"' for example, the court did not mention flexi-
bility at all, but stated that "the court must consider the [Daubert] factors." '42
The court applied each factor and found them to weigh against admissibil-
ity 43 This case is not as striking, however, as those cases in which the
Daubert factors of general acceptance and publication (qualified in Daubert
as inapplicable to novel theories) are downplayed in order to deny admissibil-
ity. After noting that the four Daubert factors "have been authoritatively
identified as important," the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in Libas, Ltd.
v. United States4' assumed for the sake of argument that a customs test for
classifying fabrics was widely accepted. 4' The court then observed that
general acceptance "is an imperfect proxy for reliability."'46 Rather than
giving great weight to general acceptance, the court used the flexibility of
Daubert - "not a rigid formula" - to emphasize the other three factors in
136. 167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999).
137. See Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146,155 (3d Cir. 1999).
138. Id.
139. In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742.
140. See Heller, 167 F.3d at 165.
141. 49 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (D. Kan. 1999).
142. Koch v. Shell Oil Co., 49 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1268 (D. Kan. 1999) (citing Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,592-93 (1993)).
143. See id. at 1268-69 (applying Daubert factors).
144. 193 F3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
145. Libas, Ltd. v. United States, 193 F.3d 1361,1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
146. Id. at 1368.
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Daubert.'4 In Allison v. McGhan Medical Corp.,'48 the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals approved the trial court's Daubert ruling excluding testi-
mony that was based on peer reviewed publications.'49 Quoting Daubert, the
court stated that publication "is not a sine qua non of admissibility" and "does
not necessarily correlate with reliability," a proposition that would seem to
lead to liberal admissibility of unpublished science.' The court used the
aphorism to downplay the expert's conclusions. Moreover, the court observed
that appellant could not explain why the studies relied on were different from
more established studies,' even though other courts have emphasized that
testimony cannot be excluded "simply because the conclusion was 'novel."" 2
In United States v. Cordoba,'53 after emphasizing the flexibility ofthe Daubert
factors, the court rejected the argument that a testable theory subjected to peer
review is admissible; the court then found error rate and general acceptance
weaknesses.' Similarly, inBushore v. Dow Corning-Wright Corp., 5 publi-
cation of observations that were in conflict with mainstream research did not
help because publication does not equate to reliability. 6
These cases present a particularly interesting vision of science as truth.
All of the uncertainty and tentativeness of science emphasized in Daubert
falls on the side of error and bad science that should not be admitted. The
flexibility of the Daubert standard allows courts the leeway to downplay
certain factors to admit testimony, such as general acceptance or publication,
and to enforce strictly the four factors to disallow testimony. But it also
permits courts to disallow testimony that is generally accepted or published
because those factors do not correlate with reliability.
In short, judges are free to frame Daubert as more liberal than Frye
insofar as novel theories are admissible, or less liberal than Frye insofar as
general acceptance or publication is insufficient. We will highlight that
difference in our discussion of the third principle - the acknowledgment of
conflicting admissible scientific testimony. The flexibility principle, however,
147. Id. at 1369.
148. 184 F.3d 1300 (llth Cir. 1996).
149. Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300,1314 (1 lth Cir. 1996).
150. It at 1313 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593
(1993)).
151. See id. at 1314.
152. Hellerv. ShawIndus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146,153 (3d Cir. 1999).
153. 194 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1999).
154. United States v. Cordoba, 194 F.3d 1053,1058 (9th Cir. 1999).
155. 1999 WL 1116920 (M.D. Fin. Nov. 15,1999).
156. See Bushore v. Dow Coming-Wright Corp., No. 92-344-CIV-T-26C, 1999 WL
1116920, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 1999) (stating that poor testing, high rate error, and lack of
general acceptance all militated against admissibility).
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initiates a framework that permits various perspectives on science to remain
in play in federal courts.
B. Conclusions Versus Methodology?
Our second interpretive principle from Daubert, the distinction between
conclusions and methodology, also functions in post-Daubert jurisprudence
as a marker of philosophical predispositions. That is, to the extent that a
strong distinction is maintained between conclusions and methodology, the
likelihood that novel scientific theories will be admissible increases. Con-
versely, to the extent that the distinction collapses, federal courts can impose
a more traditional view of science as a stable enterprise.
The distinction between conclusions and methodology was clear in
Daubert: "The focus [of the four-factor inquiry], of course, must be solely on
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate."1 57 Such
a limited focus is consistent with the view that novel science may not be
generally accepted or published, but will nevertheless be admissible if it rests
on sound methodology. Shortly after Daubert was decided, however, the
court in In re Paoli opined that the distinction between methodology and con-
clusions "has only limited practical import. 158 '"When ajudge disagrees with
the conclusions of an expert, it will generally be because he or she thinks that
there is a mistake at some step in the investigative or reasoning process ofthat
expert. '159  Nevertheless, "the judge should not exclude evidence simply
because he or she thinks there is a flaw... which renders the expert's conclu-
sion incorrect."" The judge should exclude evidence only "if the flaw is
large enough that the expert lacks 'good grounds' for his or her conclusion."
The new distinction in In re Paoli is therefore between conclusions based on
large methodological flaws and conclusions based on "good grounds." Thus,
the Daubert conception can be reformulated to say that the focus must be
solely on whether there are good methodological grounds and not on the
conclusions they generate. This is not so different from Daubert, because the
only conclusions to be critically examined are those based on flawed method-
ology, which keeps the Daubert distinction alive. Indeed, the court in In re
Paoli conceded that the distinction "remains of some import... to the extent
that there will be cases in which a party argues that an expert's testimony is
unreliable because the conclusions ...are different from those of other
experts. In such cases, there is no basis for holding the expert's testimony
157. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
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inadmissible."'162 The only qualification seems to be that a trial court does not
abuse its discretion by examining an expert's conclusions "to determine
whether they could reliably follow from... the methodology used.' 63 The
distinction otherwise remains intact.
The Joiner Court confirmed this qualification when it observed that
"conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another."'16
The explanation is a bit different - rather than focusing on large methodologi-
cal flaws to reject certain conclusions, Joiner focuses on the size ofthe "gap"
between "de data and the opinion offered."'165 In his Joiner dissent, Justice
Stevens observed that the distinction between methodology and conclusions
began to collapse." The methodology used by Joiner's experts was based on
the "weight of the evidence" - taking all of the studies together to formulate
a conclusion that is scientifically acceptable."1 The trial judge, however,
"examined the studies one by one and concluded that none was sufficient to
show a link between PCBs and lung cancer."a Ifthe trial judge had remained
faithful to Daubert's rule agains "assessing the validity or strength of an
expert's conclusions," the opinions of qualified experts reaching "relevant
conclusions on the basis of an acceptable methodology" would have been
admissible.169 For Justice Stevens, the trial judge saw too great a gap between
the data and the opinion because, contrary to Daubert, he focused on the
conclusions and not on the methodology used."7 ° To say that conclusions and
162. Id. at 746 n.15 (citations omitted).
163. Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146,153 (3d Cir. 1999).
164. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,146 (1997).
165. Id.
166. See id. at 151 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. Id.
168. Id. (noting that "the Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA) uses the same methodol-
ogy"). But see Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating
that weight-of-evidence "methodology results from the preventive perspective that agencies
adopt in order to reduce public exposure to harmful substances. The agencies' threshold of
proof is, reasonably, lower than that appropriate in tort law.").
Grounding admissibility in an assessment of individual studies ignores the possibility that
the sum findings of individual studies may be sufficiently valid and reliable, though each study
considered alone may have methodological shortcomings or relatively low statistical power to
detect certain differences. Meta-analysis is a widely used method in science for increasing the
sample size by aggregating results across individual studies. See generally META-ANALYSIS FOR
EXPLANATION (Thomas D. Cook et al. eds., 1994). Cf Charles Kiesler, Mental Hospitals and
Alternative Care: Noninstitutionalization as Potential Public Policy for Mental Patients, 37
AML PSYCHOLOGIST 349 (1982) (evaluating ten studies flawed in different ways but all reaching
same conclusion, and concluding that taken together, these studies usefully informed public
policy).
169. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 154.
170. See id. at 153.
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methodology "are not entirely distinct" was neither accurate nor helpful in
assessing Joiner's experts.''
Recent federal court opinions are inconsistent as to how to treat the
distinction between methodology and conclusions. In Cabrera v. Cordis
Corp.,72 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the test "is not the
correctness of the expert's conclusions but the soundness of his methodol-
ogy. 1 73 In National Bank of Commerce v. Associated Milk Producers,174 the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "a district court is not free to choose
between the conflicting views of experts whose principles and methodology
are reliable and relevant." 75 Likewise, a district court in Baker v. Indian
Prairie Community School District Unit 20476 held that the Daubert inquiry
"should be based 'solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclu-
sions that they generate."" 7
7
In contrast, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in In re TMlLiigation,17
after quoting Daubert on the distinction, went on to quote Joiner ("conclu-
sions and methodology are not entirely distinct")17 9 and Heller (court "must
examine the expert's conclusions in order to determine whether they could
reliably flow" from the facts and methodology). ° to conclude that 'too great
an analytical gap between the data and the opinion preferred"' will render the
opinion inmfficiently reliable to admit.' In Moore v. Ashland Chemical
Inc.,"2 the en bane Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals quoted Joiner at length to
conflate the conclusions/methodology distinction and then found no error in
the trial court's finding of"to great an analytical gap" in the testimony of Dr.
Jenkins.' The dissent in Moore concluded otherwise:
171. Id. at 155.
172, 134 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1998).
173. Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 134 F.3d 1418, 1421 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 1995)).
174. 191 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 1999).
175. National Bank of Commerce v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 191 F.3.d 858, 862
(8th Cir. 1999).
176. 1999 WL 988799 (N.D. 111. Oct 27, 1999).
177. Baker v. Indian Prairie Cmty. Sch. Dist. Unit 204, No. 96 C 3927,1999 WL 988799,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct 27, 1999) (citations omitted).
178. 193 F.3d 613 (3d Cir. 1999).
179. In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 665 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting General Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)).
180. Id. (quoting Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146,153 (3d Cir. 1999)).
181. Id. (quoting Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146).
182. 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998).
183. Moore v.Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269,277 (5th Cir. 1998) (quotingJoiner, 522
U.S. at 146).
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Inthepresent case, there was no "analytical gap" betweenDr. Jenkins' data
and his opinion .... [The] district court excluded Dr. Jenkins' opinion
simply because he did not have any hard scientific support for his clinical
medical opinion, notbecause of a gap in reasoning. Dr. Jenkins' clinical
medical opinion was, in fact, snuglybased on the sound application ofthe
well accepted methodology of his discipline.'"
Moore is significant because the en banc court divided over how to apply
Daubert to clinical medical testimony, such that the division over how seri-
ously to take methodology/conclusion distinction is hidden in the margins.s'
In Greenwell v. Boatwright,'86 however, the division on a Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals panel highlighted the implications of how a court uses the
distinction between conclusions and methodology.'10 The majority empha-
sized that trial courts "are not to be concerned with the reliability of the
conclusions generated by valid methods, principles and reasoning.""r Be-
cause the plaintiffs on appeal were challenging the inferences and not the
factual basis of an expert's testimony, the testimony could not be excluded."8 9
The dissenting judge, however, characterized Daubert as a means to detect
and to exclude junk science, which requires a careful assessment of '"he
scientific conclusions and reasoning of experts because jurors are frequently
overly impressed by conclusory opinions of an expert paid by a party.11190
Judges "may no longer indulge in this assumption that an expert's conclusions
and reasoning can all be corrected by cross-examination as in the past."'
Judge Merritt collapsed the distinction between conclusions and methodology
and even reformulated the endorsement found in Daubert of "the traditional
means of testing evidence in the adversary system rather than the wholesale
exclusion of evidence under an uncompromising test."'" The "traditional
means" are not working, so an uncompromising test may be necessary.
184. Id. at 290 n.8.
185. See also United States v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329, 1336-37 (9th Cir. 1999) (dividing
on how seriously to take methodology/conclusion distinction).
186. 184 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 1999).
187. See Greenwell v. Boatwright, 184 F3d 492,497 (6th Cir. 1999).
188. IM (quoting United States v. Bonds, 12 F3d 540,555 (6th Cir. 1993)).
189. See id.
190. Id. at 501 (Merritt, 3., dissenting). Recent research, however, casts considerable doubt
on the assumption that juries are overly impressed by expert scientific or statistical testimony.
See Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive
Expert andLay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REv. 1109,1133-39 (1997) (reporting on jurors' reaction
to expert testimony in capital cases and also citing other studies).
191. Greenwell, 184 F.3d at 502.
192. National Bank of Commerce v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 191 F.3d 858, 862
(citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,596 (1993)).
57 WASH. &LEEL. REV 685 (2000)
The strong distinction between conclusions and methodology is based in
Daubert on the "capabilities of the jury and of the adversary system gener-
ally.' 93 The strong distinction parallels the warnings in Daubert that the four
factor test is flexible and that general acceptance and publication are not
dispositive because "well grounded but innovative theories" will not meet
those tests.194 The breakdown of that distinction, however, parallels the
warning in Daubert that "a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how
flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authen-
tic insights and innovations," because law, unlike science, is not "advanced by
broad and wide-ranging consideration of a multitude ofhypotheses."'195 When
Justice Blackmun spoke of "conjectures that are probably wrong,'196 the
propriety of viewing "a known technique which has been able to attract only
minimal support" with skepticism,"9 and the unlikelihood of good, unpub-
lished science, 9' the picture of science changed from a field of competing,
well-grounded theories to one of competition in the courts between published,
generally accepted science and "all forms ofjunk science that may creep into
the courtroom."'" These two pictures co-exist in federal courts and are
determined in part by whether the distinction between conclusions and meth-
odology is maintained.
C. Good Versus Junk Science, or Good Science in Conflict?
Finally, our third interpretive principle in the wake of Daubert is whether
and how clearly courts acknowledge the obvious possibility of conflicting but
admissible scientific testimony. Like the other two principles, the differences
in approach among federal courts is subtle but detectible in how Daubert is
framed and used as authority. In Joiner, for example, Justice Stevens sus-
pected that the trial court, as well as the majority against which he was dis-
senting, were too anxious to label the testimony of Joiner's experts "junk
science" because those experts had used "the same scientific approach" as the
petitioners' experts who reached different conclusions.' ° In In re Paoli, the
court confirmed that ajudge's assessment that an expert's opinion is incorrect,
193. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
194. Id. at 593.
195. Id. at 597.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 594.
198. See id. at 593 ("[Slubmission to the scrutiny of the scientific dommunity is a compo-
nent of 'good science."').
199. Greenwell v. Boatwright, 184 F.3d 492, 501 (6th Cir. 1999) ("Trial judges must be
on guard against all forms ofjunk science that may creep into the courtroom.").
200. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 154 (1997).
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"that there are better grounds for some alternative conclusion," does not make
the opinion inadmissible, because the standard of reliability "is not that
high."20 1 Thus, some federal courts, like Justice Blackmun in Daubert, refer
to "shaky but admissible" evidence.2" Likewise, Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola
of Puerto Rico Bottling Co.,203 concluding that the district court "set the bar
too high," held that "Daubert neither requires nor empowers trial courts to
determine which of several theories has the best provenance."2°4 In Terran v.
Secretary ofHealth and Human Services, 5 the petitioner suggested that 'tthe
Daubert framework is narrowly intended to prevent the introduction of 'junk
science' into trials," but the court disagreed and characterized Daubert as "a
broader tool for analyzing the admissibility of scientific testimony."1206 In
National Bank of Commerce v. Associated Milk Producers, the court reluc-
tantly found no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's exclusions of expert
testimony and pointed out that:
[A] district judge is not to judge the validity of competing conclusions of
expert witnesses, but rather to limit its gate-keeping role to determining
whether the expert testimony offered by the parties meets the Daubert
standards.... Moreover, we have cautioned thatthe district court may not
rely solely on the lack of published studies... because in some cases
scientific propositions may have been too new to have been published or
tested.
207
The Heller court, citing In re Paoli, also emphasized that a novel conclusion
is admissible if based on reliable methodology.2 °"
On the other hand, in Allison v. McGhan Medical Corp., the court ap-
proved a finding of inadmissibility, noting that the appellant "does not explain
why the [the studies relied upon by her experts] should trump more than twenty
controlled epidemiological studies."2' The court found no abuse of discretion
in the trial court's "considering that the proffered conclusions in studies with
questionable methodologies were out of sync with the conclusions in the over-
201. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717,744-45 (3d Cir. 1994).
202. American Computer Innovators, Inc. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 74 F. Supp. 2d
64,69 (Mass. 1999); Dauber v. Mcrrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993); Heller
v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146,152 (3d Cir. 1999).
203. 161 F3d 77 (1st Cir. 1998).
204. Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77,85 (1st Cir. 1998).
205. 195 F3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
206. Terran v. Secretary ofHealth & Human Servs., 195 F3d 1302,1316 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
207. National Bank of Commerce v. Associated Mdilk Producers, Inc., 191 F.3d 858, 864
(8th Cir. 1999).
208. See Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing In re Paoli
R1R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717,746 (3d Cir. 1994)).
209. Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300,1314 (11th Cir. 1999).
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whelming majority ofthe epidemiological studies presentedto the court."2 ' Of
course, in Allison, this was only one of many factors used to reject the testi-
mony. However, the willingness to compare a novel view with mainstream or
majoritorian science betrays a tendency to identify one side's theory as correct
and any conflicting testimony as incorrect. That tendency is reflected in Lust
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1 in which the court rejected testimony
because the expert failed to identify and defend novel results,212 and in Conde
v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.,213 in whichthe court faulted an expert for failing to
explain the grounds for the differences between his view and the collective view
of his scientific discipline.2" 4 Such deference to mainstream science militates
against the view that science is uncertain and tentative and therefore that
mainstream science is often wrong and replaced by novel views that then
become mainstream science. Moreover, although such deference is inconsis-
tent with one "reading" of Daubert, it is consistent with another. Courts are
free, following Daubert, to emphasize the likelihood of good, conflicting
science, orto suspect that one side in a conflict is peddling courtroom or 'Junk"
science. These different emphases reflect different visions of science.
The struggles over good versus junk science are most readily apparent in
cases involving disputes about the qualifications of scientific experts. In
United States v. Bighead,215 decided before Kumho Tire, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered whether Daubert guidelines applied to a clini-
cian's testimony concerning the psychological sequelae of child abuse.216 The
testimony was based on experience in interviewing alleged abuse victims.
Holding that Daubert was inapplicable, the majority characterized the wit-
ness's testimony as "specialized knowledge, not scientific knowledge." 2 17 But
a forceful dissent argued that the majority "reads Daubert too narrowly,"
making it impossible to "distinguish[ ] [the expert testimony] from pseudo-
science. n218 For the majority, the expert's reliance on clinical experience
alone made her testimony non-scientific. The dissent, however, required a
Daubert review in order to avoid letting pseudoscience into the courtroom:
The expert was "not a psychologist and not a psychiatrist"219 but only a thera-
pist, and '"there is a range of education, sensibility, and competence among
210. Id. at 1316.
211. 89 F3d 594 (9th Cir. 1996).
212. Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 89 F.3d 594,598 (9th Cir. 1996).
213. 24 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1994).
214. Conde v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 24 F.3d 809, 814 (6th Cir. 1994).
215. 128 F.3d 1329 (9th Cir. 1997).
216. United States v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329 (9th Cir. 1997).
217. Id. at 1330 (quoting United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225,230 (9th Cir. 1997)).
218. Id. at 1335.
219. Id. at 1336.
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such workers."" ° The dissent quoted, with disapproval, one expert's view that
"[b]ecause we see it clinically, we see something we believe is real, clinically,
and whether or not... scientists... agree that it is real, most of us have some
sort of personal sense that it is."'" The Bighead dissent adopted a good
versus junk science stance and characterized the testimony as junk science
that must not be allowed through the gates ofDaubert.m For the majority, the
testimony was simply not science and was not transformed into junk science
merely because the scientific community had a different view.'
220. Id. at 1338. This distinction between "hard" science, involving controlled empirical
testing, versus "soft" science, involving clinical or experiential data, is frequently conflated with
the distinction between science and non-science. Evidence on the battered woman's syndrome
is a good example. Viewing such evidence as "unacceptably soft science" because it is derived
from unreliable interview and self-report studies and the experience of clinicians, some commen-
tators argue that it should be excluded under Daubert. Stephen J. Morse, The Misbegotten
Marriage ofSoftPsychology andBadLaw, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 595, 595 (1990); David L.
Faigman & Amy Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in theAge ofScience, 39 ARIZ. L. REV.
67, 68 (1997) ("In short, in the law's hasty effort to use science to further good policy, it is now
obvious that the battered woman syndrome is not good science nor does it generate good
policy."). Faigman et al., supra note 45, at 1832, stated:
[I]n a wide range of cases, "scientific" opinions are offered into evidence with little
or no empirical research data behind them .... These "clinical judgments" do not
qualify as science in the absence of empirical evidence ... these judgments could be
tested for accuracy, but the requisite data are not yet available.
Id.; see also Risinger et al., supra note 119, at 437 ("A hypothesis that cannot be subjected to
empirical testing is a metaphysical proposition that is by definition not part of science.").
Never mind that the testimony of experienced clinicians or researchers - some having
interviewed hundreds of battered women - is based on "knowledge, skill, experience, [and]
training" as required to qualify as expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. See
Morse, supra note 17, at 287 ("[Vloluminous anecdotal research rarely produces more than
volumes of anecdotes."). Much of clinical practice is driven by practical experience, not science.
See, e.g., Marilee M. Kapsa & Carl B. MeyerScientfifc Experts: Making Their Testimony More
Reliable, 35 CAL. W. L. REv. 313, 324 (1999) ("[O]nly 15% of the decisions a doctor makes
every day are based on evidence.") (citing Nancy GibbsA Week in the Life ofa Hospital, TIME,
Oct. 12,1998, at 68)). Much of the value of social science research comes in debunking common
myths (e.g., that battered women stay with the batterer because they are masochistic), and myths
are most prevalent when the relevant scientific research is still in its infancy. See Morse, supra
note 17, at 321 (discussing role of myths in scientific research).
221. Bighead, 128 F.3d at 1338 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (quoting RIcHARD OFSBE &
ETHAN WATrERS, MAKING MONSTERS: FALSE MEMORMS, PSYCHOTHERAPY, AND SEXUAL
HysnmA 177-204, 195 (1994)).
222. See also Faigman et al., supra note 45, at 18323 (arguing judges should not permit
end run around Daubert by admitting clinical testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702
as "technical or other specialized knowledge"). Daubert requires that expert knowledge be
testable: "[J]udges' failure to query the empirical basis for clinical judgments would eviscerate
the Daubert rule. All pseudoscience can be redescribed as specialized knowledge; expert
opinion based on the research of Stephen King will be as welcome as that based on the research
of Stephen Hawking." Id.
223. The science versus non-science distinction has perhaps been the most stark in state
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Again, to the extent that courts in their broad discretion are relatively
inflexible in their use of the Daubert factors, willing to collapse the distinc-
tion between conclusions and methodology, and less likely to believe that two
conflicting theories may both be good science, a picture of science emerges
that is traditional and positivistic. Onthe other hand, in courts that are flexible
regarding the four factors, that maintain a strong conclusions/methodology
distinction, and that readily acknowledge the possibility of good, conflicting
scientific testimony, a picture emerges that is somewhat more in sync with
current views in the history, philosophy, and sociology of science. Both views
of science, remarkably, find support in Daubert though, as discussed below,
the "two views" dichotomy seriously misrepresents the state of affairs when
importing into law insights from the history and philosophy of science.
V Importing Insights About Science
We mistake... the authenticallydogmatic and so legislative
character of scientific philosophy, by which I mean the
thoughtimplicit in science's thinking aboutitself, aswellas
the academic discourse of the philosophy of science ....
Can we think of science in terms of its function as a pro-
ducer or theatre of symbols? And can we imagine that
modem science, like the classical religions, implies apoli-
tics of speech... 7
court child abuse cases involving autistic or mentally retarded children, where prosecutors
sought to introduce communications from the victims elicited through "facilitated communica-
tion." The technique, which ostensibly allows communication through assisted typing, has been
tested in a number of controlled experimental studies that not only failed to validate the
technique but also found that the supposed communications were often the result of facilitator
leading. Every scientific and professional organization on record has stated that the technique
is without scientific support. See Brian J. Gorman, Facilitated Communication: Rejected in
Science, Accepted in Court-A Case Study andAna 4sis of the Use ofFC Evidence Under Frye
and Daubert, 17 BEHAV. ScL & L. 517, 518-19 (1999) (noting that scientific and professional
organizations state technique is without scientific support).
Yet by characterizing the technique not as a scientific method or tool but as a translation
much like an interpreter's translation of a foreign language, many courts have admitted testi-
mony obtained through facilitated communication. As in Bighead, courts wishing to admit such
evidence find comfort in the unscientific nature of the evidence. Courts excluding it find, after
aFrye- orDaubert-type review, the evidence to be inadmissible pseudoscience. As if meaning-
ful empirical testing could be undertaken in the courtroom, one court admitting facilitated
communication evidence noted that it need not satisfy the criteria for the admissibility of
scientific evidence because "the proffered facilitated communication lends itself to empirical
rather than scientific proof." Id. at 535 (quoting State v. Warden, 891 P.2d 1074, 1087 (Kan.
1995)). Consequently, "under Daubert, trial courts can admit scientific evidence falsified and
rejected by the scientific community. Additionally, under Joiner, 'good' theories of respected
scientists can be excluded by the court's own falsification." Id. at 540.
224. Pierre Legendre, IdEffcit QuodFigurat (It Is the Symbol Which Produces Effects):
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A. Law and Interdisciplinarity
[W]hat people call interdisciplinary work often involves
answering questions in one discipline by applying its disci-
plinary methods to the materials usually studied by
another.... One is always within whatever discipline one
is in, and one simplyassimilates and feeds information from
and about other disciplines into one'spre-existing disciplin-
ary matrix.=
Even the most casual reflection on the relations between law and other
disciplines confirms a complex phenomenon. Insights from extra-legal discip-
lines provide bases from which to understand or to criticize or to reform legal
institutions and practices. Interdisciplinary legal studies come to mind im-
mediately - law and economics, law and psychology, law and literature, and
so forth. The commitment to interdisciplinary approaches can be traced to
American legal realism, whose heirs include the empirically-oriented Law and
Society movement, the expansive Law and Economics movement, and even
Critical Legal Studies 6 (a tradition now dissipated into feminist and critical
race scholarship, postmodem legaltheory, and various literary and psychoana-
lytic critiques of law). Beyond the academy, though perhaps not (in the minds
of hopeful scholars) beyond its influence, legislatures and courts borrow from,
integrate, and institionalize knowledge from extra-legal disciplines. Legisla-
tive committees and trial judges rely on experts from fields relevant to social
problems and legal controversies.
Despite the attractiveness of this picture, interdisciplinarity has its risks.
Scholars, judges, or lawmakers can misunderstand or fail to appreciate the
disagreements and controversies in extra-legal disciplines.tm Examples ofthe
latter include adopting one version of an historical employment, one school
of psychology, one account of textual interpretation, one hypothesis in envi-
ronmental studies, or one economic paradigm when such a version, school,
account, hypothesis, or paradigm is the subject of considerable disagreement
within its home field.
Two different types of interdisciplinary analysis are prevalent in legal
discussions on law and science. First, the introduction and use of expert
The Social Constitution of Speech and the Development of the Normative Role of Images, 20
LEGAL STUD. F. 247,248 (P. Goodrich tans., 1996).
225. .M. Balldn, Interdisciplinarity as Colonization, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949,959
(1996).
226. See William W. Fisher ]IM et al., Introduction to AMERICAN LEGAL REAuSM ii)-dv
(W. Fisher et al. eds., 1996).
227. See generally Balkin, supra note 225 (describing obstacles to interdisciplinary re-
search in law and legal academy); Redding, supra note 69 (describing how "law and psychol-
ogy" research has often failed to be truly interdisciplinary).
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scientific testimony in trial courts is an obvious example of interdisciplinary
interaction. Some legal controversies require or benefit from scientific knowl-
edge. A second type of interdisciplinary inquiry, initiated in Daubert and
continued in scholarly and judicial literature concerning Daubert, involves the
adoption and use of insights from the history, philosophy, and sociology of
science, a collection of disciplines concerned with the nature of scientific
discovery and progress.' The focus of this Article is on this second type of
interdisciplinarity, that is, on the legal narratives about science - its history,
essence, methodology, and certitude. Legal narratives rely on those extra-
legal disciplines for which scientific activity is the object of inquiry.
Much of the discussion in law concerning the history, philosophy, and
sociology of science is oversimplified for the sake of clarity and economy of
language, and the debates are often not taken seriously. The result is not only
a failure to appreciate the interdisciplinary enterprise, but also a failure to
adequately address the fundamental question raised in Daubert about the
nature of science. Legal scholars have made a useful distinction between
traditional views of science (as the accumulation of objective knowledge) and
new views of science (as culturally embedded) to help readers understand the
decades-old debate among historians, philosophers, and sociologists of sci-
ence. 9 As discussed below, however, the distinction is only a pedagogical
starting point for understanding a continuum of positions.
B. Critical Reflections on Science
Aradicalissomeonewho claimsthatscientific knowledgeis
entirely constructed "out of' social relations; aprogressivist
is someone who would saythat it is partially constructed out
of social relations but that nature somehow "leaks in" at the
end. At the other side of this tug-of-war, a reactionary is
228. In an article like this one complaining about oversimplification in interdisciplinary
legal research, we concede a certain oversimplification in referring to the "history, philosophy,
and sociology of science" as the relevant disciplinary fields. Jonathan Potter recently pointed
out that "in the last two decades one of the notable features of the field [of social studies of
science] is the wide interdisciplinary collaboration among sociologists, philosophers and his-
torians of science, psychologists, linguists, and literary analysts." PorrER, supra note 18, at 17.
Bruno Latour, in his discussion of the deadlock in social studies of science, delighted in the
"researchers [who] are looking for ways out of the deadlock. in literary theory, biology, cogni-
tive science, cultural history, ethnology, ethnography of skills, moral economics, interactionism,
and networks." Bruno Latour, One More Turn After The Social Turn, in THE SCIENCE STUDMS
READnR, supra note 18, at 276. Because the term "science studies" often has radical connota-
tions, our reference to "the history, philosophy, and sociology of science" is an attempt to
capture all traditional and contemporary studies of science discussed in this Article.
229. See, e.g., Farrell, supra note 17, at 2189-98 (contrasting positivist view and construc-
tionist view); Imwinkelried, supra note 7, at 59-65 (contrasting traditional popular conception
of science with modem conception of science).
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someone who would claim science becomes really scientific
only when it finally sheds any trace of social construction;
while aconservativewould saythatalthoughscience escapes
from societythere are still factors from societythat "leakin"
and influence its development In the middle, would be the
marsh ofwishy-washy scholars who add alittlebit of nature
to a little bit of society and shun the two extremes ....
... I claimthatthe onlywayto go onwith [science stud-
ies] is to abandon this frame of reference ....
The existing frame of reference, contrary to Bruno Latour's recommenda-
tion, is initially a useful representation of the ongoing academic debates about
the nature of scientific discovery and progress. Latour's reference to "social
relations," "social factors," and "social construction" with respect to the scien-
tific enterprise highlights the problem of how to explain or account for the
personal interests of scientists, the interests of scientific institutions or com-
munities, the effects of scientific training, and the experimental and linguistic
conventions of science. If one takes the position that science is an objective
inquiry into nature or reality, which proceeds on the basis of factual observa-
tion, then how does one explain the rejection of established theories in favor
of new theories throughout the history of science? The traditional answer,
termed "reactionary' by Latour, is that science makes mistakes or errors that
are corrected as science progresses toward truth. Because errors are explained
by human sociological or psychological factors, even the most conservative
accounts of science concede a human or subjective element."1 Mistakes
might be explained by reference to poor training, poor instruments, false
presuppositions, or community or individual bias toward a particular (but
230. Latour, supra note 228, at 279.
231. Jonathan Potter identified Robert Merton as a traditional sociologist of science who
"started from a received view of the nature of scientific facts - that they are impersonal, empir-
ically warranted, rigorously tested." POTTERsupra note 18, at 18. For Merton, modem science
is sustained by norms like universalism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. Id. Potter
stated:
Although Merton stressed the importance of... norms for guiding the scientific
activity of fact-finding, he also stressed that scientists do not always conform to
these norms. At times there is fraud; scientists may keep results to themselves or
pass them only to selected associates; there may also be prejudice against particular
individuals or groups ....
... Prejudice against a group of researchers may result in the maintenance of
a mistaken theory in the face of a correct altemative, or individual ambition may
lead a scientist to falsify findings to fit a desired model .... False belief could be
directly explained through a "social fact" (personality, prejudice, and so on)
disrupting the proper operations of scientific norms .... Put simply, in this view
of science, the facts themselves determine truth, while error is explained by pro-
cesses of a psychological or sociological nature.
Id. at 19.
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wrong) theory. For example, the amicus brief filed in Joiner by The New
England Journal ofMedicine, purporting to describe the nature of scientific
evidence, represents a traditional view of science. 2 While science is charac-
terized by "its complete reliance on objectively verifiable evidence," 23 3 this
characterization will not explain all changes in science. Accordingly, the
amicus brief s author conceded that science is tentative and probabilistic and
that "even the most honest researchers ... are likely to be enthusiastic about
their ideas and... not aware of flaws in the design of their study."234 Never-
theless, science is "not a matter of opinion or argument," but "of evidence."235
This strong positivist view of science is alive and well in many quarters of the
natural and empirical social sciences."
This formulation suggests that social and psychological factors are not
part of science but are impediments to the scientific enterprise. Because the
amicus brief emphasizes the unfortunate likelihood of such factors ("research-
ers may unconsciously misrepresent their work or exaggerate its impor-
tance2s37), it adopts a "conservative" stance in Latour's frame of reference."
In short, scientists are human, but science itself, which can protect "against
unwarranted conclusions" by peer review and other collaborative efforts,
transcends opinion and argument?239 Significantly, the scientific community,
as opposed to individual, enthusiastic scientists, is represented as a stable
foundation for science.2' It is the activity of individual scientists, represented
232. Brief of Amici Curiae New England Journal of Medicine and Marcia Angell, M.D.,
in Support of Neither Petitioners nor Respondents, General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136
(1997) [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
233. Id. at 5.
234. Id. at 12-13.
235. Id. at 18.
236. See Risinger et al., supra note 119, at 439 ("It is probably not very controversial to
say that, within the realm of factual inquiry, the properly tested products of the enterprise of
science, where relevant, are the most dependable sources offactual information available to
human beings." (emphasis added)).
237. Amicus Brief, supra note 232, at 12.
238. See supra note 230 and accompanying text ("[Tlhere are still factors from society that
'leak in' and influence its development.").
239. Amicus Brief, supra note 232, at 12. But see Redding, supra note 69, at 592-97 (dis-
cussing studies showing bias in peer review process and throughout scientific process - from
hypothesis generation to publication process).
240. In fact; some legal commentators argue that the scientific community is the only
proper judge of scientific validity. See Paul S. Mlich, ControversialScience in the Courtroom:
Daubert and the Law's Hubris, 43 EMORY L.L 913, 919, 923 (1994) (arguing that science
should be only source of its reliability). Mlich wrote:
Scientists who have spent the greater portions of their professional lives wrestling
with the complexities and mysteries of their disciplines must be amazed at the law's
hubris in thinking that nonscientist judges can "get up to speed" on a scientific
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as the changing social factor, that helps to explain away errors in the history
of science.
A more progressive, using Latour's terminology,24" ' view of science,
which has been characterized as a "powerful and widespread" reaction to
traditional ideals of empirical observation,242 highlights the inevitable role of
theoretical expectations in organizing perception.24' Instead of viewing scien-
tific theories as following from observation, and viewing observational experi-
ments as the way to adjudicate between theories, theoretical presuppositions
are seen as shaping observation and experiment from the outset.244 This
psychological model is also a social theory of the way scientific communities
work. Thomas Kuhn's famous paradigmtheory45 emphasized how communal
presuppositions can support a research program of "normal science" for a
time, after which the successively appearing anomalies in the program are
sufficient to bring on its revolutionary overthrow in favor of a new research
program.246 Note that the scientific community is the stabilizing aspect of
science, as it was in the conservative view, but now the community has
become a changeable social factor that directs scientific observation and
experiment. The scientific community is no longer the cure to avoid the taint
of social factors, but is the primary social factor. Likewise, sociological anal-
ysis is no longer reserved for falsehoods but serves to explain normal science.
In view of our criticism of certain legal narratives about the study of
science, several observations can be made concerning the development of the
progressive perspective on the social aspects of scientific theory and practice.
argument and ultimately decide who has the better of the argument .... Science
is the only source of its own reliability.
Id.
241. See supra note 230 and accompanying text
242. See GALTSON, supra note 18, at 9.
243. See general/y THOMAS S.KUHN, THESTRucTURE OFSCIENIIFICREVOTIONS (1962).
244. See GALisON, supra note 18, at 9 (stating that Kuhn stresses "how theoretical expecta-
tions profoundly shape what is observed and when"); see also id. at 8-9 (discussing Kuhn's
view of philosophy of science). Galison stated:
... Kuhn assailed the universal adjudicating power of experiments, and therefore
their independence from theory. Instead of arguing that observation must precede
theory, Kuhn contended that theory has to precede observation. The history of
science, for Kuhn, amply demonstrated the essential role theory plays in the
conduct of experimentation, in the interpretation of data, and in the definition of
"relevant" phenomena.
Id.
245. See KLT-N, supra note 243, at viii (stating paradigms are "universally recognized
scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community
ofpractitioners").
246. See id. at 10-22 (discussing paradigm theory).
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While it is useful to speak of a transformation in the history, philosophy, and
sociology of science growing out of the grand theories of Karl Popper,247
Thomas Kuhn,2' and Paul Feyerabend249 in the 1960s and 1970s, the critique
of science is not a unified field of inquiry. Indeed, the grand theorists them-
selves held quite different views on science. Popper, even in his challenge to
logical empiricism, thought that experiments could adjudicate between
theories.1 0 Kuhn disagreed, but was uncomfortable with radical views that
247. Karl Popper's CONjECTuEBs AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE (1972) and OBJCiVE KNOwiHXG: ANEVOLUTIONARYAPPROACH (1 972) were
certainly viewed in the 1970s as crucial to the breakdown of logical positivism, because Popper
was willing to study the context of discovery - the historical dimension of the production of
knowledge. See generally GERALD RADNrZKY, CONTEMPORARY SCHOOLS OF METASCIENCE:
ANGLO-SAXONSCHOOLSOFMETASCIENCECONTRNNTALSCHOOLSOFIETASCIENCE,x V-XXVI
(1973). Interestingly, while Popper is known for inspiring critics of traditional philosophy of
science, contemporary historiography tends to classify Popper as quite traditional. In other
words:
Despite [Popper's] own claims that it was he who killed positivism (1974), the
accidental fact that the English edition of Popper's [The Logic of Scientific Discov-
ery (1959)] appeared shortly before Kuhn's [The Structure ofScientific Revolutions
(1962)] put him in a position to become a primary defender of the positivist faith
against the Kuhnian heresy.
GIERE, supra note 14, at 211.
248. Kuhn is generally credited, alongside Paul Feyerabend, see infra note 249, for initi-
ating the social and linguistic turn in the history and philosophy of science. In other words:
The contemporary situation within the philosophy of science has been decisively
shaped by its encounter with the work of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend.
Whatever Kuhn and Feyerabend themselves would say about the matter, their work
has been widely interpreted within philosophy and elsewhere as an attack on the
rationality and cultural authority of the sciences.
RousE, supra note 10, at4. Their work, that is, "led inexorably to the strong forms of epistemic
relativism for which post-postivism is notorious." LAUDAN, supra note 14, at 9.
249. Paul Feyerabend's AGAINST METHOD (1972) has been viewed as the radical fringe of
the first wave of attacks on logical positivism and on scientific knowledge as not just relativistic
but anarchistic: "Feyerabend gleefully champions 'irrationality' against the type of rationality
defended by critical rationalists [like Popper]. He claims that if one applies the standards of
Popper and his followers one is forced to conclude that science itself is a thoroughly irrational
discipline- and ought to be." BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 4.
250. According to Galison:
Popper did not disturb the logical positivists' basic faith that experiments unambig-
uously adjudicate among theories. Sir Karl's famous suggestion that theories be
evaluated on their "fasifiability" - how open they were to experimental discon-
firmation - depended essentially on the possibility of matching competing theories
with the clear results of experimental evidence.
GALTsON, supra note 18, at 7. Additionally
For Popper, Science is distinguished from non-science by the activity of trying
critically to test hypotheses and resisting the temptation to make continual ad hoc
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challenged the rationality of science." Feyerabend, who practically viewed
science as a religious practice, inspired much more radical accounts of the
sociality of science. He believed science is not affected by social phenome-
non but is a social phenomenon.'
Serious debates have followed, and a spectnn of positions are identifi-
able on several key issues. For example, on the question of whether science
describes nature or reality, one may believe that: (1) the findings of science
are determined by natural phenomena, (2) our access to nature is affected by
biases that must be identified and rooted out, (3) theoretical expectations are
an inevitable part of science, (4) social interests (e.g., professional interests)
actually condition perception of external nature, (5) facts are constructed
against the resistance of nature, or finally, (6) scientific facts are social
constructs. Moreover, some realists concede that science rests on inevitable
and influential social and linguistic structures, but rejecting social construc-
tivism, they emphasize the approximation of scientific models or probabilities
to natural reality. Any attempt to reduce this spectrum to two views, or to the
old view and the new view, wrongly suggests that the debates have stagnated
or that the "knowledge" in studies of science is somehow stable and easily
exportable into other disciplines such as law.
modifications to keep hypotheses going in the face of counter-evidence ....
Popper was strongly critical of Kuhn's suggestion that periods of "normal," stable
and unquestioning science are necessary for its development; for him this was
simply bad science.
POTTER, supra note 18, at 24.
251. See GIERE, supra note 14, at41 (stating that "in appealing to psychological and socio-
logical factors to explain the historical development of science, [Kuhn] implicitly rejected any
search for rational principles of theory choice"). But see ROUSE, supra note 10, at 4 n.6 ("It is
now widely recognized that this image of Kuhn as an 'irrationalist' is quite at odds with Kuhn's
own self-understanding ... ."). See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE ESSENTAL TENSION
SELcUrED STUDiS iNSCmTIC TRADnONAND CHANGE (1977) (responding to misinterpreta-
tion of his work as attack on rationality in science).
252. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 87 ("Feyerabend... presses his views much
further than Kuhn."); LAUDAN, supra note 14, at 14 ("Feyerabend supposed that there was no
rational machinery for resolving methodological differences between scientists."). In Laudan's
words:
[Feyerabend] insists... scientists have frequently utilized methods that fly directly
in the face of all our "rational" guidelines. Thus, scientists sometimes proceed
'counter-inductively,' deliberately ignoring contrary evidence and the testimony of
their senses. Oftentimes, scientists refuse to give up hypotheses that appear to have
been decisively refuted. Frequently, they lie, cheat, suppress information, propa-
gandize, and resort to all manner of other trickery to persuade others.... [S]uch
apparently deceitful behavior is, on Feyerabend's view, absolutely crucial to the
advance of science.
Id. at 100.
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Most accounts ofthe last thirtyto forty years of studies of science identify
an old view associated with: (1) logical empiricism in philosophy,"s
(2) Merton's "norms of science" in sociology, 4 and (3) traditional stories of
linear progress from ignorance to truth in the history of science." If one
contrasts this with a new view, associated with (1) Karl Popper in philos-
ophy, 1 6 (2) modem sociology of scientific knowledge,' 7 and (3) Kuhn's para-
dign theory ofthe history of science,"5 the problems with such an account are
evident. As Latour's continuum illustrated, with respect to social influences
on science, there are numerous middle positions between the radicals-and-
progressives and the reactionaries-and-conservatives. Moreover, the so-called
"new" views of Popper in the philosophy of science, of the early sociologists
of scientific knowledge, and of Kuhn inthe history of science would all now be
somewhere in the middle because of more radical developments in those fields.
While it is accurate to highlight Karl Popper's rejection of Rudolf
Camap's logical positivism 9 and inspiring "falsification" thesis,2" social con-
253. See, e.g., GAUSON, supra note 18,at7.
254. See, e.g., POTTER, supra note 18, at 17-18 (finding Merton's norms of science include
universalism, communism (i.e., knowledge is openly shared), disinterestedness, and organized
skepticism).
255. See, e.g., Steve Fuller, Does Science Put an End to History, or History to Science?,
46-47 Soc. TExT 27,31-32 (1996). Fuller wrote:
According to Kuhn, scientists need to tell stories of collective progress .... The
professional historian is wont to tell a story filled with so many accidents and
failures that it would dispirit fledgling natural scientists. In a manner that Kuhn
called "Orwellian," every scienlific revolution must be followed by a rewriting of
the discipline's history to make the victorious party appear the natural heirs ....
Id.
256. See, e.g., GALISON, supra note 18, at 7 (describing Popper's break from logical
positivism but confirming his fidelity to capacity of experiments to confirm theories).
257. See, e.g., POTER, supra note 18, at 25-34.
258. See, e.g., GIERE, supra note 14, at34 ("Thomas Kuhn's Structure ofScientifcRevolu-
lions (1962) has emerged as the single most influential work on the nature of science to be
published since World War IL") But df Norton-Smith, supra note 10 (arguing that history of
science provides very limited and questionable benchmark or model for understanding modem
scientific progress; rather, we should consult current scientific practices because 90% of
scientists who have ever lived are alive today, success of modem science is unparalleled, and
modem scientific practices are radically different than those of past).
259. See GAUIsoN, supra note 18, at 7.
260. Popper thought that science could never achieve absolute truth but could obtain suc-
cessively closer approximations to it But it "would seem that the same limitations which keep
us from accessing the truth with certainty would also preclude us from knowing when we were
'approaching' it." Sean O'Connor, The Supreme Court's Philosophy ofScience: Will the Real
Karl Popper Please Stand Up?, 35 JURIMETRIcs 263, 276 (1995); see also W.V.O. QUImE,
FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF Vmw: 9 LOGicO-PHImOSOPHCAL ESSAYS 20 (1961) (providing
influential post-positivist critique of Popper's falsifiability principle).
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structivism, the view that scientific facts are manufactured rather than
discovered, is not obviously Popperian. Moreover, there are numerous versions
of social constructivism- some more radical than others and thus further from
the middle position that Popper has come to represent. 62 Even if, for purposes
of scholarly discourse, we can identify "a cluster of important doctrines that
distinguish" constructivism, there are still plenty of "new" philosophers of
science that are as uncomfortable with constructivism as they are with the "old"
view.2" Any simple distinction between old and new is problematical.
261. The most eminent scientist of the twentieth century, Albert Einstein, noted that
"[p]hysical concepts are free creations of the human mind... not... uniquely determined by
the external world." ALBERT EINSTEIN & LEOPOLD INFELD, THE E VOLUION OF PHYSICS: THE
GROWTH OF IDEAS FROM EARLY CONCEPTS TO RELATIVITY AND QUANTA 33 (1938). See
generally KARIaqD. KNORR-CETNA, THE MANUFACTUE OF KNOWLEDG: ANESSAYON THE
CONSTRUCTIVIST AND CON1XTUALNATURE OF SCIENCE (1981); ANDREW PICKERING, CON-
STRUCTING QUARKS: A SOCIOLOGICAL HISTORY OF PARTICLE PHYSICS (1984) (providing
example of how physics is constructed). The view that scientists construct scientific "facts"
rather than discover them has been expressed by numerous scientists and philosophers of
science. See, e.g., BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACrS (1979); Kenneth J. Gergen, The Social Constructivist
Movement in Modern Psychology, 40 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 255 (1985); Sandra Scarr, Construct-
ing Psychology: Making Facts and Fables for Our Times, 40 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 499, 499
(1985).
262. See POTrER, supra note 18, at 35 ("The term 'constructionism' is used with a number
of distinct and sometimes contradicting shades of meaning across the social sciences and even
within [the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge] itself."); see also GIERE, supra note 14, at 43.
Giere stated:
Historians and sociologists associated with the Edinburgh school have produced an
imposing set ofhistorical cases which they claim illustrates the role of various kinds
of interests [including personal, professional, social, political, or a combination] in
the development of science.
Other "new wave" sociologists of science are even more radical. It is not just
that nonscientific interests "influence" scientists' judgements about theories.
Rather, science is totally constituted by human interests and interactions. Science
is simply a social construct, like morals or the law.
Id. at 43.
263. Arthur Fime, Science Made Up: ConstructivistSociology of Scientific Knowledge, in
THE DSmNIY OF SCIENCE: BOUNDARIES, CONTEXT AND POw'ER 231,233 (P. Galison & D.
Stump eds., 1995) (giving as example view that beliefs that are relative to and explainable by
reference to social circumstances and are locally caused (i.e., not caused by truth or rationality)).
264. See GIERE, supra note 14, at 44 ("Philosophers... have been seeking objective criter-
ia for rational scientific progress. Sociologists... argue that scientific progress is no different
from political or social progress. One wonders whether there is not a middle way. I think there
is."); LAUDAN, supra note 14, at 3 (distancing himself from both positivist orthodoxy and
epistemological and methodological relativism that replaced it); ROUSE, supra note 10, at 148
(rejecting "distinction between autonomous social and/or natural 'worlds,'" and thereby reject-
ing both naturalism and social constructivism). Significantly, Giere, Rouse, and Laudan have
distinct and inconsistent analyses. Laudan argued for science as rational, and he was a strong
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In social studies of science, the sociology of scientific knowledge can be
characterized as the relativistic view that displaces traditional sociology of
science, but Collins's early Empirical Programme of Relativism265 must be
distinguished from later constructivist and interest theories of scientific
knowledge and practice.2" Similarly, in the history of science, Kuhn's
seemingly revolutionary views have been criticized and overtaken by histori-
ans, some influenced by social constructivism and social interest theorists and
others returning to ideals of rationality. The so-called "strong program,"
which treats science like any other cultural activity, goes far beyond Kuhn's
view that theory shapes science." In other words,
[w]e are witnessing, after the Kuhnian move from continuity and verity of
scientific knowledge to discontinuity and relativity, anotherturn- from the
critic of "the new crazies" - his term for everyone from Kuhn to the most radical social con-
structivists. LAUDAN, supra note 14, at 3. Rouse was a proponent of cultural studies of science
and viewed Laudan as locked into old-style legitimation of science. See RoUsE, supra note 10,
at 8-9, 36, 60, 64. Giere characterized his account as representational, naturalistic, cognitive,
and evolutionary, and was critical of Laudan and, impliedly, Rouse. See GIES, supra note 14,
at 41-43, 53-55.
265. See PoTrER, supra note 18, at 25-34. Potter contrasted Collins's work with:
the traditional sociology of science, which focused on the social conditions or
norms that enable the generation of true knowledge, and on the way particular
social or psychological factors such as prejudices and personal ambitions led to
scientific errors. For Harry Cofins, ... this traditional work legitimated any
current status quo by presupposing the correctness of any current state of belief.
It assumes that what scientists take as valid scientific knowledge needs no social
explanation, for it is adequately accounted for by the nature of the natural phenom-
ena that are being studied.
Id. at 25. While adopting a relativist stance toward science, however, "Collins adopts a realist
stance when conceptualizing the activities and beliefs of scientists." Id. at 30. Thus, while
Collins was disinterested in the truth of scientists' judgments, he made the same type ofjudg-
ments about the social world. Id. at 32.
266. See PoTrTR, supra note 18, at 34-40 (discussing Collins). Constructionist and interest
theories share with Collins's work a rejection of traditional sociological accounts of how "social
norms ... ensure the production of true knowledge, as well as the idea that the task of the social
analyst is to account only for scientific errors." Id. at 34. Constructionist accounts, however,
are generally more ethnographic and observational, generally focus on unfinished knowledge
rather than controversies, and are sometimes less likely to hypothesize that the natural world
makes no difference to science. Id. at 36-37. Social interest accounts, instead of emphasizing
a scientists rhetorical (rather than technical, experimental) success, like Collins, emphasize
individual interests, group allegiance, and political viewpoints to explain the success of certain
theories. Id. at 37-38.
267. See LAUDAN, supra note 14, at 183 (identifying Mary Hesse, Martin Rudwick, Barry
Barnes, Steven Shapin, David Bloor, and Kenneth Caneva as adherents). The "strong program"
is a reference to the Edinbergh Strong Programme or the Edinbergh School of the Sociology of
Knowledge, so named because of the tendency to view scientific knowledge as a social con-
struction and not just as involving a social context. Id.
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Kuhnian predilection for science as theory to post-Kulmian engagement
with science as experiment.2"
The turn to the history of science as a history of experimental practices, not
simply of theories, is represented by ethnographic and anthropological studies
of the scientific enterprise. These studies look at science as if it is another
culture and scientists a "tribe." But even among those who make the turn to
the study of practices, instruments, experiments, and techniques by visiting
laboratories, museums, and fields269 and give an account of the "different
professional cultures, moral economics, forms ofinitiation, collaboration, and
negotiation that develop in these sites,"' ' 0 there are disagreements about the
characterization of science as a social and cultural activity. Is scientific
knowledge always local, interested, constructed, and supported by persuasive
rhetorical networks, or does that picture denigrate the role of nature too much?
This question persists in studies of scientific texts as literary and rhetorical,"'
of gender dimensions of science, 2 of different cognitive styles in different
historical and national cultures,2 3 and of the politics of science."
On the other hand, there is a strong reaction against social studies of
science that is best characterized not as a return to positivism, but as an
alternative to positivism that corrects its errors yet retains its best features,
including some form of realism.s Significantly, that project is not the same
as the movement toward realism by those engaged in social studies of science,
which movement engenders another strong reaction by critics of those who
lapse into realism or become "closet" realistsY6 Indeed, the political termi-
268. Hans-J6rg Rheinberger, Experimental Systems, Graphematic Spaces, in INSCRIBING
SCIENCE: SCIETIcF1cEXS AND ThE MATEIRU OF COMMUICATION 285 (Timothy Lenoir
ed., 1998).
269. See DON IHDE, EXPANDUINrHERPME CS: VISUALSMIN SCIENCE 135-36 (1998)
(describing "going native" approach to science in which science critic is participant in scientific
research teams, approach more common in Scandanavian and Dutch Universities); Knorr-
Cetina, supra note 18, at 287-310 (reporting observations at large research laboratory).
270. Mario Biagioli, Introduction: Science Studies and Its Disciplinary Predicament to
THE SCIENCE STUDIES READER, supra note 18, at xi, xv.
271. See generally INSCRBING SCIENCE: SCIENTHIC TEXTS AND THE MATERIA=flY OF
COMMUNICATION (Timothy Lenoir ed., 1998); POTrER, supra note 18, at 42-121.
272. See generally GIEE, supra note 14, at 200-16; EVELYN FoX KELLR, RELECTIONS
ON GENDER AND SCIENCE (1985); Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, The Multiple Realities ofSameness
and Difference: Ideology andPracice, 53 3. Soc. IssUEs 259 (1997).
273. See generally Sharon Traweek, An Introduction to Cultural and Social Studies of
Sciences and Technologies, 17 CULTURE, MED., & PSYCHIATRY 3 (1993).
274. See generally Stanley Aronowitz, The Politics of the Science Wars, 46-47 SoC. TEXT
177 (1996); Redding, supra note 69.
275. See supra note 264.
276. See generally Timothy Lenoir, Was the Last Turn the Right Turn?, in THE SCIENCE
STUDIES READER, supra note 18, at 290-301.
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nology used by Latour betrays the character of the debates about the nature of
science - discussion is charged, ideological, and full of disagreements about
each side's evidence and whether it is compelling. For our purposes, Latour's
frame of reference represents the "discipline" or collection of sub-disciplines
from philosophy, history, sociology, literary theory, cultural studies, ethnol-
ogy, anthropology, and gender studies that is being called upon when the
United States Supreme Court or interdisciplinary legal scholars reflect upon
the nature of scientific discovery and practice.
P7. Legal Reflections on the Nature and Philosophy of Science
In the philosophy of science the scope of the constructivist
programfitsinwiththe "bigmethodologists,"likePopper...
and Kuhn, each of whom, not sutrprisingly, rejects itYn
Actors, interests, politics, power, and authority have ac-
quired the status ofkeyterms in a "strong program" to treat
science on par with any other cultural activity whatsoever.
That Thomas Kuhn is "among those who have found the
claims ofthe strongprogramabsurd"... mightnotsurprise.'
A. Daubert and Science
The Daubert Court rejected the "general acceptance" test from Frye v.
United States.279 Ifthe Frye test allowed judges to let the scientific commu-
nity decide whether an expert's testimony was reliable, then Daubert ap-
pointed trial judges as gatekeepers to discern good from bad scientific theo-
ries."0 When Justice Blackmun offered several observations about the nature
of scientific knowledge and methodology, the Court logged onto Latour's
frame of reference and took a position on the nature of scientific knowledge
alongside the historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science who occupy
that continuum.
In Daubert's wake, judges and lawyers were concerned about whether
the federal judiciary should enter that debate and take an "official" position
on the nature of science.21 On remand to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
277. Fine, supra note 263, at 232.
278. Rheinberger, supra note 268, at 285.
279. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585-93 (1993) (citing Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013,1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
280. See id. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.3., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I do not
doubt that [Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibil-
ity in deciding questions of the admissibility of proffered expert testimony.").
281. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his partial dissent to Daubert, claimed not to
understand "what is meant when it is said that the scientific status of a theory depends on its
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Judge Kozinski, in a portion of his opinion titled "Brave New World," ob-
served that "scientists often have vigorous and sincere disagreements as to
what research methodology is proper."'  He then concluded:
Our responsibility; then, unless we badly misread the Supreme Court's
[Daubert] opinion, is to resolve disputes among respected, well-creden-
tialed scientists about matters squarely within their expertise, in areas
where there is no scientific consensus as to what is and what is not "good
science," and occasionally to reject such expert testimony because it was
not "derived by the scientific method." Mindful of our position in the
hierarchy ofthe federaljudiciary, we take a deep breath and proceed with
this heady taskU3
Not surprisingly, Daubert has beenthe subject ofvoluminous critical commen-
tary. Some find the new standard unworkable, some find the opinion unclear,
and some offer new frameworks of analysis. 4 Meanwhile, federal judges
(and many state court judges) have applied Daubert since 1994, and the
Supreme Court has issued two opinions - General Electc Co. v. Joiner and
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael - to clarify the standard of review of admis-
sibility rulings 5 and the applicability of Daubert to non-scientific experts. 6
The twenty-two amicus briefs filed in Daubert addressed "definitions
of scientific knowledge, scientific method, scientific validity, and peer re-
view."' All this interest was understandable in light of the fact that the
'falsifiability'," suspected that some trial judges would likewise be confused, and worried about
imposing on trial judges "either the obligation or the authority to become amateur
scientists .... " Id. at 600-01 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
282. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phanns., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311,1316 (9th Cir. 1995).
283. Id. at 1316.
284. See generally Capra, supra note 17 (stating that trial courts are confused asto whether
Daubert regime is more strict or more permissive; rejection of Frye is not compelling as policy
matter, Daubert opinion vague); Gottesman, supra note 17 (arguing Daubert inconsistent with
congressional intent regarding Federal Rules of Evidence); Imwinkelried, supra note 7 (extend-
ing implications of Daubert beyond vast amount of myopic commentary); Koukoutchos, supra
note 17 (finding some progress in Daubert regarding judicial apprehension of science, but some
regress as well); Mansfield, supra note 17 (noting confusion remains as to meanings of
"scientific" testimony, "scientific validity," "falsiflability," and even "science").
285. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,138-39 (1997) ("We granted certiorari
in this case to determine what standard an appellate court should apply in reviewing a trial
court's decision to admit or exclude testimony underDaubert.").
286. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1997) ("This case requires
us to decide how Daubert applies to the testimony of engineers and other experts who are not
scientists.").
287. Daubert v. Merrel DowPharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,598-99 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that briefs were "markedly different from
typical briefs, in that large parts of them do not deal with decided cases or statutory language").
288. Id. at 599 (Rehnquist, C.J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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United States Supreme Court was preparing to issue a pronouncement on
science and its authority in legal culture. 9  In simplest terms, the Frye
"general accepace" standard' enacted a certain colonization of law by the
scientific elite, 1 and any revision to that standard would likely constitute a
challenge to the dominance of science as the discourse of rationality, plausi-
bility, and legitimacy. m
While Justice Blackmun conceded that "arguably, there are no certainties
in science," he also confirmed that any "inference or assertion must be derived
by the scientific method" to qualify as scientific knowledge. 3 Later in the
opinion, he defined scientific methodology as generating falsifiable hypothe-
ses, and identified the key standard for admissibility as being whether a theory
or technique has been tested.' At this point, the Court adopted what Latour
would call a reactionary position with respect to science - "someone who
289. See Mansfield, supra note 17, at 19. Mansfield stated:
[Given] the large number of amicus briefs filed by eminent scientists and important
scientific organizations,... [it] would appear that the scientists who allowed their
names to be put on these briefs believed ... that somehow the fate of science was
at stake in the role of admissibility the Court would adopt and that there is a
connection between the admissibility of evidence in courts of law and standards of
proof to be satisfied in contexts important to science....
Id.
290. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (stating that expert
opinion based on scientific technique is inadmissable unless technique is "generally accepted"
as reliable in relevant scientific community).
291. See, e.g., Milich, supra note 240, at 914 (arguing in favor of Frye standard, which
recognizes that "trial courts should not accept scientific evidence unless and untit science
accepts it").
292. Michel Serres, for example, has warned that law, like the arts and religion, is in
decline, because science lately "has all the power, all the knowledge, all the rationality, all the
rights, too, of course, to all plausibility or legitimacy." MIcHEL SERREs & BRUNO LATOUR,
CONVERSATIONS ON SCIENCE, CULTURE, AND Tnt 87 (R. Lapiduslrans., 1995). Chief Judge
Markey, of the United States Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit, worried that "juriscience"
would replace jurisprudence. Howard T. Markey, Jurisprudence or "Juriscience"?, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 525, 525 (1984). "If the development of science is viewed as a race for domi-
nance between science and law, science appears to be winning. We perceive the infallible,
objective, dedicated nature of the scientific method as the solution to all of man's problems .... "
Id. at 526. But cf Brian Z. Tamanaha, An Analytical Map ofSocial Scientific Approaches to the
Concept ofLaw, 15 OXFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 501,533 (1995) (arguing that culture increasingly
is confused with law and that we live in "the age ofthe symbolic ascendance of law").
293. Daubcrt v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (defining "scien-
tific" and "knowledge" in Federal Rule of Evidence 702: "Scientific" implies "a grounding in
the methods and procedures of science," and "knowledge" connotes "more than subjective belief
or unsupported speculation").
294. See id. at 593. The falsiflability or testability criterion is identified as the core of good
science by commentators in the positivist tradition who urge courts to exclude scientific
evidence not subjected to empirical testing. See generally Faigman et al., supra note 45; Faig-
man & Wright, supra note 220; Morse, supra note 220; Risinger et al., supra note 119.
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would claim science becomes really scientific only when it finally sheds any
trace of social construction."' Justice Blackmun cited Popper's falsifiability
thesis,' which represents in the philosophy of science a critique ofthe logical
empiricist view that theory can be separated from experiment. For Popper,
theory was essential to the practice of experimentation, which seems to be an
acknowledgment of social and psychological influence. But Popper also kept
his "faith that experiments unambiguously adjudicated between theories," so
the social factor could be eliminated. s7 Professor Mansfield has pointed out
that the references to Popper in Daubert "leave a mistaken impression as to
the authoritative position [Popper's views] hold among scientists and philoso-
phers of science."'  We agree - the Court gave no indication that it was
choosing one controversial position in a highly contested field.
The next paragraph of Daubert (following the adoption of the falsifi-
ability standard) contains the famous aphorism that publication "does not
necessarily correlate with reliability."299 One paragraph later, Justice Black-
mun made the same move regarding "general acceptance" - it remained a very
important consideration, but it is not required."° Numerous commentators
have identified this part of the opinion as "the social turn," because an ac-
knowledgment that an unaccepted, novel theory may be good science implies
that the accepted science just might be outdated." 1 This is called a "social"
turn because the outdated science, which was obviously not entirely grounded
295. See supra note 230 and accompanying text
296. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 ("[Ihe criterion of the scientific status of a theory is
its falsiflability, or refutability, or testability." (citing K. POPPER, CONJECTEJES AND RFJ A-
TfONs: THE GRoWTH OF Scanmsc KNOWEDGE 37 (1989))).
297. See GALTSON, supra note 18, at 7 ("Sir Karl's famous suggestion that theories be
evaluated on their 'falsifiability' - how open they were to experimental disconfirmation -
depended essentially on the possibility of matching competing theories with the clear results of
experimental evidence.").
298. Mansfield, supra note 17, at 11; see also Risinger etal., supra note 119, at 438 n.103
(noting conflict between Popper and his critics).
299. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) ("[[]n some
instances well-grounded but innovative theories will not have been published.").
300. Id. at 594. Significantly, the language of the opinion regarding general acceptance
is quite guarded. Justice Blackmun did say that general acceptance can "have a bearing on the
inquiry," and that lack of general acceptance" may properly be viewed with skepticism, but he
did not clearly state the implication that a view that was not generally accepted could be
admissible evidence. Id
301. See, e.g., Farrell, supra note 17, at 2196 ("[S]tatements of fact gain their validity not
from their closeness to objective truth, but from the authority and legitimacy of those who
pronounce them."); Imwinkeried, supra note 7, at 61 ("Rather than being characterized by
constant progress, the history of science consists of a succession of superceded theories.");
Koukoutchos, supra note 17, at 2239 (arguing that science is cultural and social activity); id.
at 2244 ("Advancement in scientific understanding frequently comes from what was once
denounced as unorthodox").
739
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in nature, likely became the received view in part because of communal bias
and persuasive networks. Combine this implication with the Court's state-
ments that there were no certainties in science, and you have a Kuhnian
version of scientific progress: Normal science is biased in favor of a ruling
theoretical paradigm that may be overthrown someday soon." The Frye
"general acceptance" standard would have allowed mainstream scientists to
keep novel theories out of federal court, but on the suggestion of numerous
amici,30 the Court adopted a more modem approach based on insights from
the history and philosophy of science. As Justice Blaclamun noted, someamid were fearful of a "free-for-all" of pseudoscience, but conventional pro-
cedural safeguards should serve to prevent that."
While Justice Blackmun also addressed the possibility that "authentic
insights and innovations" may not be admitted under the new standard in some
cases,"5 that "is the balance that is struck by rules of evidence designed not
for the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding, but for the particularized
resolutions of legal disputes."3" This comment apparently suggests a sensitiv-
ity to the scientific orthodoxy of a ruling paradigm. The text as a whole,
however, refers instead to the possibility of legal scientific orthodoxy, not
scientific orthodoxy," 7 because Justice Blackmun characterized science itself
as open-minded."°a The general tenor of these remarks is, in Latour's terms,
reactionary-3. Science allows "a multitude of hypotheses" so that "those that
are incorrect will eventually be shown to be so, and that in itself is an ad-
vance." 310 In other words, science advances by rooting out errors. No social
turn here!
Evelyn Fox Keller has highlighted a polarizing tendency in the discourse
about the nature of science - we are
propelled either toward objectivism, or towards relativism. In one direc-
tion,... science return[s] to a premodem... conception in which...
302. See supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text.
303. See Imwinkelried, supra note 7, at 64 ("Amicus submissions... shared this common
denominator, all endeavored to disabuse the justices of the 'mythical' popular conception of
science.").
304. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595-96.
305. Id. at 597.
306. Id.
307. Butthe possibility of scientific orthodoxymay be even greater. See generally Redding,
supra note 69 (discussing how law outpaced science in cases where there was scientific ortho-
doxy).
308. See Daubertv. Merrell DowPharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 573, 597(1993) ("[T]he scientific
project is advanced by broad and wide-ranging consideration of a multitude of hypotheses.").
309. See supra note 230 and accompanying tex
310. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
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science [has been collapsed] back onto nature. Under the other, we are
invited into a postmodnist ... (and post-scientific) utopia in which...
science run[s] free, no longer grounded... by nature - indeed, in
which.., nature [has] effectively disappeared altogether. Attempts to
occupy a "middle ground".., must contend not only with the conceptual
difficulty of formulating such a position, but also with the peculiarly
insistentpressures ofapublic forumurging [the concept of science] toward
one pole to the other."'
Thus, we can sympathize with Justice Blackmun because middle positions are
difficult to formulate and there is pressure to adopt one of the extremes. In
Daubert, however, the pressure seemed to be toward a reactionary view of
science. In the three Daubert passages discussed above concerning the
scientific enterprise, the first and last gave no indication that science is even
partially a product of social relations. The middle passage indirectly echoed
Kuhn's paradigm theory, which is at best a "wishy-washy" middle position in
Latour's frame of reference312 and at worst is a temporary nod to the history
of science that is eclipsed by the linear view of scientific progress implied by
the surrounding passages.
The significance of Daubert, of course, is not its contribution to the
history and philosophy of science. No one expects a United States Supreme
Court opinion to be a model of interdisciplinary research. Daubert, on the
other hand, has spurred a lot of interest in the history and philosophy of
science, much of it critical of Justice Blackmun's reflections on the nature of
the scientific enterprise."' Yet, a tendency persists to oversimplify the
history, philosophy, and sociology of science as reflecting two views, result-
ing in a failure to engage that disciplinary cluster of debates.
B. The Two-View Thesis in Law and Science Studies
Professor Imwinkelried, who consulted with the Daubert plaintiffs in
preparing their Supreme Court brieft noted in 1995 that although Daubert
"generated an avalanche of commentary," few articles focused on Justice
Blackmun's description of the scientific process.314 Imwinkelried's own anal-
ysis of Daubert contrasted the 'traditional popular conception of science,"
which he described as an idealized Newtonian vision that "scientific proposi-
tions are capable of attaining true certainty," '315 with the "modern conception
311. Evelyn Fox Keller, The Gender/Science System: Or, Is Sex to Gender as Nature Is
to Science?, in THE SCIENCE STUDIES READER, supra note 18, at 234,235.
312. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
313. See, e.g., Farrell, supra note 17, at 2198-2207 (describing Blackmun's view as "inco-
herent"); Mansfield, supra note 17, at 10-17 (criticizing Daubert majority's reasoning).
314. See Imwinkelried, supra note 7, at 58.
315. Id. at60.
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of science," which acknowledged uncertainty. 16 Inwinkelried then explicated
the latter view to include the realization that progress was discontinuous,
Kuhn's paradigm theory of scientific revolutions, Popper's falsifiability criter-
ion, the recognition that errors were unavoidable in experimentation, and the
inability of statistics based on group data to establish causality in particular
cases3 17 Justice Blackmun, we are told, rejected the "'mythical' popular con-
ception of science" in favor of this modem view. 18
Imwinkelried's representation of two views, one old and one new, sug-
gested a certain stability with respect to the history and philosophy of science
that does not exist.319 Imwinkelried did not, however, purport to describe that
field, but rather to describe the conception of science in the contemporary
scientific community.32 His references to the end of the scientific era, the
shattering of scientific claims to control everything by understanding natural
law, and the acknowledgment of chaotic uncertainty are tempered when the
reader realizes that the "disturbing revelations" referred to were simply the
features of contemporary scientism. 32 1 Only the weakest sense of any "social"
aspect of science is implied by references to the potential for errors in mea-
surement and flawed research.
322
Brian Stuart Koukoutchos, who authored an amicus brief in Daubert on
behalf of"an eclectic group of physicians, scientists, historians of science, and
sociologists of science," has also addressed the view of the scientific enter-
prise adopted in Daubert3" Koukoutchos contrasted the Ninth Circuit's in-
correct assumptions that "science always progresses bythe continuous accumu-
lation of objective and irrefutable truths [that are] complete, universal, immu-
table, and eternal" with the proper view that the history of science is a revolu-
tionary process, that science is a cultural, "socially embedded activity,32 4 that
observed facts are conditioned by culture, that theories are imposed on facts,
andthatthere are no whole truths, just half-truths. The latter view acknowl-
316. Seeld. at60-61.
317. Id. at 61-63.
318. Id. at64-65.
319. See id. at 58-59 (stating that "the first Section of this article describes the popular, old
conception of science .... The next Section... presents the contrasting, modern conception
of science endorsed by Justice Blackmun in Daubert").
320. See id. at 60 (noting that "the contemporary scientific community no longer subscribes
to the popular conception of science").
321. Id. at 55-56.
322. See id. at 63 (stating that "there can be errors in measurement" and that researcher's
"model may be flawed").
323. Koukoutchos, supra note 17, at 2237.
324. Id. at 2239 (ciing STEPHEN J. GoULD, TBE MMEAsuRE oFMAN21(1981)).
325. Id. at 2239-40.
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edges the limitations of statistical evidence, the danger of consensus as a
standard,326 the mistakes made by the best scientists, and the limitations of
peer review and publication as the bete noir of good science. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals missed these aspects of science. 2
Again, we count only two views, the outdated vision of science as a
producer of certainty and the new view found in Daubert. Koukoutchos
seemed to view the social embeddedness of science and the effect of theory
on facts as errors. In the forum of free, open, and vigorous debate, 'Vte best
tonic for bad science is good science"'3 and it is the "eventual disappearance
of disagreement.. . that marks a field as a science. '31 Koukoutchos was not
quite as convinced as Imwinkeried that Daubert adopted the correct, modem
view of science because the closing paragraphs of Justice Blackmun's opinion
"lapsed" into confusing science withtruth.30 The vision of science inDaubert,
however, is represented as the view received by those who study scientific
theory and practice.
3 31
In commentary on a progressive opinion like Daubert, one expects a
contrast between an older position, represented by the history of evidence law
(Imwinkelried) or by Frye and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals's first
Daubert opinion (Koukoutchos), and the new view adopted by the United
States Supreme Court. Yet, any radical or even progressive vision (in
Latour's frame of reference) that science is unavoidably a social phenomenon
is eclipsed by the representation of two views of science, old and new, avail-
able to legal thought.
Professor Farrell's analysis of the "wo generalized epistemological
positions reflected in" Daubert was likewise structured by that opinion.3 32
Farrell, however, was much more attuned to developments in the history,
philosophy, and sociology of science. Although we criticize the utility of the
representation that there are two views in studies of science primarily because
of the erasure that it effects on the field, Farrell managed to compress a
326. See Redding, supra note 82, at 120-22 (discussing danger of consensus as standard);
Redding, supra note 69, at 586-88 (providing examples where scientific consensus, which
ostensibly debunked law's common wisdom, turned out to be flawed, with law actually out-
pacing science).
327. Koukoutchos, supra note 17, at 2241-51.
328. Id. at2251.
329. Id. at 2243 (emphasis added).
330. See id. at 2251-53 ("But I detect a lapse in Daubert ... those who seek in science the
immutable truth... are apt to be disappointed.").
331. See id. at 2238 ("All in all,Daubert constitutes several steps forward in judicial appre-
hension of science, and perhaps one step back.").
332. See Farrell, supra note 17, at 2185 ("This article begins by briefly exploring two
generalized epistemological positions reflected in the Daubert decision.").
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variety of theoretical positions in her two-part analysis." Interestingly, she
did not contrast the "old" view of scientific certainty with the "new" view in
Daubert; instead, she divided the field differently. Farrell reserved the term
"scientific positivism" for both the old-fashioned view (that science is a value
free inquiry, that "the human mind and the objective world are distinct") and
several more modem views (like Popper's falsification standard, as well as his
understanding that while "subjective perception mediates" observation,
objective knowledge can nevertheless be based on inter-subjective consensus
about empirical observations).' Farrell then contrasted that framework,
which is in play in Daubert, with the "constructivist view" that also was part
of Justice Blackmun's opinion.335 In the constructivist camp, she collected the
views that "there are no objective, value-free facts," that observation is condi-
tioned by scientific methods and instrumentation, that scientific knowledge is
probabilistic, that the history of science is a "succession of superceded theo-
ries" (rather than a gradual accumulation of knowledge), and that scientific
facts, processes, and even 'truths" are social constructs. 36 The positions gen-
eralzed as "constructivism" include Kuhn's paradigm theory and probalistic
approaches, as well as the stronger positions developed by sociologists of
science that view scientific validity as based on the power and authority of
scientific communities. 3 7 Because both of these inconsistent perspectives
were "unconsciously adopted in Daubert," Farrell characterized Justice Black-
mun's opinion as incoherent.
338
In our own analysis of Daubert, we argued that the social constructivist
view of science was absent from the opinion. So where did Farrell find it?
Farrell highlighted Justice Blackmun's valorization of the adversary system
and his distinction between legal and scientific fact-finding: science has time
to revise, law must act quickly, science searches for cosmic understanding,
law must resolve disputes about past events. 339 From this Farrell concluded
that Justice Blackmun was beginning - but only beginning - to see that "law
constructs facts and legal truths ... just as science constructs scientific facts
and truth." ° Farrell's point was that law should construct its own truths
333. See id. at 2189-98.
334. Id. at2189-93.
335. Id. at2193-98.
336. Id. at 2193-96.
337. Id. at 2196.
338. Id. at2198-99.
339. Id. at 2199.
340. Id. at 2204. Farrell explained:
The [Daubert] opinion extolled the virtues of law's adversary system... as "the
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible [scientific]
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rather than follow scientific constructs, because facts in each field serve
different purposes. Law is just as prescriptive - and not simply "descriptive"
of past events - as science." Justice Blackmun, however, slipped back into
scientific positivism when he failed to see that
falsification is itself socially constructed- that is, whether a methodology
can falsifythe conclusion will be deteinined bythe standards, equipment,
measurement, and error rates agreed upon by those within the scientific
community. Thus, falsifiabilityis as socially dependent as peer review and
"generally accepted" factors on prevailing scientific paradigms and the
norms of the scientific community that they support. 2
Because science has no greater claim on truth than law and because law and
science should each construct its own facts for its own purposes, Farrell
concluded that courts should not automatically defer to scientific conceptions,
but rather develop "a set of legal principles for using science's truth in the
interests ofjustice.
3 43
Farrell's superb study is notable for its cogent representation of a social
constructivist position, one that is genuinely radical in Latour's terminol-
ogy. In her analysis, science is just like any other cultural activity. Like
law, science is an enterprise with power and authority, with theories and
methodologies, with presuppositions and rhetorical networks, and with "social
institutions... and the processes... through which... legal facts are pro-
duced."W " Without questioning her analysis - she went on to convincingly
demonstrate the utility of her proposal for epidemiological evidence345 - we
might return to her generalized description of the "constructionist view." She
moved quickly past some older historians of science (e.g., Lakatos and
evidence" .... But the court refuses to rely on these truth-seeking, legal method-
ologies except when the evidence to be tested has already been found scientifically
valid. Justice Blackmun might have recognized that law constructs facts and legal
truths through these means just as science constructs scientific facts and truth
through testing and falsification for its purposes.
Id. (citing Daubert v. Merel Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993)).
341. Id. at 2204-05. This is, of course, not the same argument made by those who think
law should be like science. See, e.g., Nancy Levit, Listening to Tribal Legends: An Essay on
Law and the Scientific Method, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 265-66 (1989) (arguing scientific
criteria should be applied in law to provide criterion for rationality and validity); John Veilleux,
Note, The Scientific Model in Law, 75 O0. L.J. 1967, 1969-71 (1987) (arguing law is like
science). Rather, Farrell is suggesting that science is no better than law. See supra note 340
and accompanying text.
342. Farrell, supra note 17, at 2205.
343. Id. at2217.
344. Id. at2197.
345. See id. at 2207-17.
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Kulm),346 who would not have joined her in the move, to sociologists of
science who "have concluded that scientific truths are socially constructed.
3 47
In the sociology of science, however, some would believe she has gone too
far, and some that she has not gone far enough. Peter Galison, for example,
found troubling the notion that all of science is interested, which denigrates
the role of nature and exaggerates the flexibility of theory." s On the other
side of Farrell, an even more radical approach recommends challenging "the
abstract opposition... between immanent or internal analysis, regarded as the
province of the epistemologist, which recreates the logic by which science
creates its specific problems, and external analysis, which relates those prob-
lems to the social conditions oftheir appearance. ' '3 49 In other words, if "in the
perspective of social construction we have lost the illusion of an ultimate
reference called 'nature,' what do we gain by trying to compensate for this
loss with the mirror image of 'society' as a new and insurmountable refer-
ence? '350 That is why Bruno Latour wanted to abandon this frame of refer-
ence entirely:
Since whatever happened had to be either the discovery of nature "out
there" or the construction of society "up there," history had to be...
explained by two lists of ingredients, one coming from nature, the other
from society. Now, on the contrary, it is the experimental scene that
produces and shapes new actants [things andpeople] thatthenincreasethe
long list of ingredients that make up our world.3"'
346. Seeid. at2194-95.
347. Id. at2195.
348. See GALISONsupra note 18,at 11.
349. Pierre Bourdieu, The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social Conditions of
the Progress ofReason, in THE SCIENCE STUDIES READER, supra note 18, at 31, 33.
350. Rheinberger, supra note 268, at 286.
351. Latour, supra note 228, at 284. Latour suggested:
[it] becomes impossible to understand brain peptides without hooking them up with
a scientific community, instruments, practices - all impedimenta that bear very little
resemblance to rules of method, theories and neurons.
"But then surely you're talking about politics? You're simply reducing scien-
tific truth to more political interests, and technical efficiency to mere strategical
manctuvres?" Here is [a] misunderstanding. Ifthe facts do not occupy the simulta-
neously marginal and sacred place our worship has reserved for them, then it seems
they are immediately reduced to pure local contingency and sterile machinations.
Yet science studies are not talking about the social contexts and the interests of
power, but about their involvement with collectives and objects....
"But if you are not talking about things-in-themselves or about humans-among-
themselves, then you must be talking just about discourse, representation, language,
texts, rhetoric." This is [another] misunderstanding. It is true that those who bracket
off the external referent - the nature of things - and the speaker - the... social
context- can talk only about meaning effects and language games.... [But] when
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Latour's disengagement of science studies from social science is both
influential and controversial. For our purposes, Latour highlighted one of the
major controversies surrounding social constructivism, which is not really a
single perspective but an ongoing debate about the nature of scientific activity
and progress. Again, we are not criticizing Professor Farrell for taking a
position in that debate and explicating it well; our concern is only with her
representation of science studies in interdisciplinary legal scholarship. All of
the approaches that might be termed "constructivist" share both a rejection of
the traditional view that social and psychological factors lead only to errone-
ous or bad science as well as a common goal of specifying how social rela-
tions and processes are implicated in the production of all scientific knowl-
edge. Variation persists, however, as to the particular social processes that
deserve the most attention and as to the role of "nature" or reality, if any, in
those processes. For example, is it the role of theoretical expectations and
communal presuppositions, experimental techniques and practices, the social
and professional interests of scientists, or networks of persuasion and negotia-
tion that best explain how facts are manufactured? And does the natural
world make no difference or is it ultimately a firewall against the social
construction of scientific knowledge?
C. Implications for Law
Two recent legal studies on the use of court-appointed experts, sensitive
to the broad range of social studies of scientific activity, help to illustrate the
diversity of that field and the differing practical implications for law that may
be drawn. The amicus brief filed in Joiner by The New England Journal of
Medicine, 2 discussed in Part V.B above, was an argument for the expanded
use of court-appointed experts as permitted by Federal Rule of Evidence 706.
Justice Breyer, in his concurrence in Joiner, quoted heavily from that brief
and encouraged judges to take advantage of this procedure to assess the
quality of expert scientific testimony proffered at trial. 31 The notion is
attractive because it suggests neutrality and disinterestedness in the face of
interested testimony prepared for one side in a trial. For those who have come
to question whether science is ever neutral and disinterested, does this repre-
I describe the invention-discovery of brain peptides, I am really talking about the
peptides themselves, not simply their represntaion .... Yet rhetoric, textual
strategies, writing, staging, semiotics - all these are really at stake, but in a new
form that has a simultaneous impact on the nature of things and on the social
context, while it is not reducible to one or the other.
LATOUR, supra note 81, at 4.
352. See Amicus Brief, supra note 232 (supporting neither party).
353. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,149-50 (1997) (Breyer, 3., concurring).
57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 685 (2000)
sent any sort of solution to the quest for stable scientific knowledge for legal
processes and institutions?
Professor Deason recently highlighted the potential for bias and undue
deference in the use of court-appointed experts."5 She referred to the "quaint"
notion of scientific certainty, sufficiently challenged by the manner in which
"scientific conclusions have been abandoned, modified, or transcended in the
last century":
355
Today there is still an appreciation that the goal of science is objective
inquiry, but there is also a growing awareness that science, like other
human endeavors, takes place in a social and political context. The an-
swers scientists offer depend in part on the questions they ask, and the
questions they ask are not only driven by the current state of development
of scientific knowledge but are also related to social norms and personal
interests.
35
An expert, even one not representing or sponsored by a party in a lawsuit,
holds views "shaped by the prevailing culture... that will affect her research
design, her interpretation of the data, or her testimony [and that are] influ-
enced by personal attitudes. '37 Scientists are influenced by preconceptions,
gender stereotypes, financial connections, and academic interests. Accord-
ingly, any judicial deference to so-called neutral scientists should be
guarded.5 ' Nevertheless, Deason did not "contend that influences such as
attitude toward gender determine the outcome of experiments or that there is
no such thing as objectivity. Reliable, replicable results are still important.
The argument is instead that scientific knowledge is limited by cultural
interests and attitudes. 35 9 Deason wavered between a weak constructivist
position, because "every scientist is a human being, '3 ° and a weak objectivist
theory, because scientific knowledge presents a "partial picture" of reality
"formed in a particular context of social values."
3 1
354. See Deason, supra note 17, at 98-99; see also Jack B. Weinstein, Science, and the
Challenges of Expert Testimony in the Courtroom, 77 OR. L. REv. 1005, 1015 (1998) (noting
that experts may represent only majority views disadvantageous to clients without economic
resources who cannot retain experts to represent minority views).
355. Deason, supra note 17, at 99.
356. Id. at 100.
357. Id. at 101-02.
358. Id. at 101-16.
359. Id. at 107.
360. Id. at 113 (quoting Eliott Marshall, When Does Intellectual Passion Become Conflict
ofInterest?, 257 SCIENCE 620, 621 (1992)).
361. Id.
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A bolder constructivist view of science is evident in Browne, Keeley, and
Hier's recommendation for the broader use of court-appointed experts.3 62 They
took the view that the scientific enterprise is not simply externally influenced
by social forces, but that the "social" is "imminent in the process itself, by
which we mean that scientists are not disinterested agents but rather are in-
mersed in a web of relations that play an important role in determining the
character of truths that emerge from their interactions."363 Facts and theories
are determined in part by "rhetorical struggles and scrambles for resources and
avid quests for collegial acceptance" of scientific claims."6 Scientists take
proactive steps to turntheir claims into unquestioned fucts, "making 'allies' out
of facts, people, money, theories, and organizations in the process.""36 The
elites formed within scientific disciplines subtly suppress dissent and enforce
disciplinary boundaries, such that when knowledge is presented in courts of
law, for example, it might seem irrefutable to ajudge orjury.3" In their view,
a court-appointed expert might somehow keep a marginalized viewpoint alive
by introducing a contrary voice." That is not the conclusion we would have
expected from social constructivists - we were thinking something like "court-
appointed experts will likely be leaders in the field who will further the hege-
mony of mainstream science." Justice Breyer in Joiner, after all, was enam-
ored ofthe suggestion that "reputable experts could be recommended to courts
by established scientific organizations, such as the National Academy of
Sciences or the American Association for the Advancement of Science."
368
That hardly seems a "strategy for overcoming the prescription against [a] new
and different idea or perspective"3 69 or an acknowledgment that "expertise is
inescapably human,""0 unless one presumes that such organizations are not
coterminous with "elites," a presumption difficult to sustain.
The use of court-appointed expert panels or science courts, proposed by
a variety of scholars3 1' does generally represent the view that there is a major-
itarian "correct" science. Thus, it is strongly positivist in orientation. Under
this framework,
362. See generally Browne et al., supra note 17.
363. Id. at 50.
364. Id. at51.
365. Id. at 56.
366. See id at 57-70 (discussing role of elites as scientific gatekeepers).
367. Id at70.
368. General Ele. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,150 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
369. Browne et al., supra note 17, at 65.
370. Id
371. See generalyArthur Kantrowitz, Proposalfor an Institutionfor Scientfiftc Judgment,
156 SCIENCE 763 (1967); Kapsa & Meyer, supra note 220, at 322.
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the results of scientific research are positive in character, just as other
materials are classified as fact. In this sense, the results of science are
indeed similarto factual reports aboutthe time of day, weather conditions,
stop light color, or the existence of a signature on a contract... Neither
have a normative component.=
The most influential proposal for court-appointed experts will surely be that
of Professors Walker and Monahan, who discussed the recent use of a Na-
tional Science Panel appointed by a federal trial judge in the breast implant
litigation and provided a legal framework for the appointment and use of
expert science panels.3 They proposed that science panel conclusions be
treated as law-like precedent374 with respect to generalizable research results
(e.g., that silicone breast implants do not cause disease) and that the trial judge
make "conclusions of law" based on panel findings. The law-like conclusion
(e.g., general causation) would be provided in the jury instructions, with the
jury adjudicating case-specific issues (e.g., specific causation).
The science panel paradigm fails to accommodate (1) the notion that both
majority and minority views may be good science and (2) the social
constructedness of science, which is particularly problematic in the social
sciences. In most cases, deference to expert panel findings on scientific
questions will produce greater accuracy than the decisions made by judges or
jurors who lack scientific expertise'" and are informed through the testimony
of less well-trained "experts." But this comes at a cost- reducing the variabil-
ity and dynamism across cases severely limits the opportunities for the ad-
versarial testing of diverse scientific evidence and experts across cases and
over time. Relying on expert panels not only limits the potential for law to
construct and inform science," 6 but also entrenches in law the established
power structures and majoritarian biases in science. When judges and the
expert panels maintain control over scientific knowledge in the courts, elite
scientific bodies become the gatekeepers of scientific evidence. Science panel
372. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, ScientificAuthority: The Breast-Implant Litiga-
fon andBeyond, 86 VA. L. REV. 801,817-18 (2000). See generalyMARCIAANGEIL, SCIENCE
oN TRIAL (1996).
373. See Walker & Monahan, supra note 372, at 821, 828 (discussing use of expert
scientific panels).
374. Id.; accord Michael . Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert- An EvolvingJurisprudence
ofExpert Evidence, 40 JUSMETRICS 229, 232-33 (2000). But see Alan 3. Tompkins & Joe S.
Cecil, Treating Social Science Like Law: An Assessment of Monahan and Walker's Social
Authority Proposal, 2 SHEPHARD'S EXPERT & SCL EVID. Q. 343, 378-84 (1994) (arguing that
it is problematic to treat research findings as legal authority because stare decisis prevents that
authority from keeping pace with changing research findings).
375. See Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107
YAIELJ. 1535, 1535 (1998).
376. See generally Redding, supra note 69 (discussing how law shapes scientific discourse).
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evaluations of scientific evidence is similar to the journal peer-review process,
which is a process not without substantial biases and flaws. Studies have
shown that reviewers' publication recommendations are substantially influ-
enced by their own theoretical and methodological biases and there often can
be considerable disagreement between reviewers.377 Therefore, whether a
journal accepts a paper for publication may in part depend on who the review-
ers happen to be.
Without regard to Deason's caution about court-appointed experts or
their utility as seen by Browne, Keeley, and Hiers, both accounts rest on a
dualistic account of the history, philosophy, and sociology of science. The
authors presented the "new" view, which is not the same in the two articles,
as a single modem perspective. They downplayed disagreements within the
field of the history, philosophy, and sociology of science to make the argu-
ment clear and to stabilize the interdisciplinary borrowing. Again, the "fairy
tale" view of science as objective and its history as a linear progression
toward truth apparently has been replaced by a new vision of science.s'
However, if a judge decided to read up on this new view of science by seri-
ously engaging the works cited in the two studies above, he or she might
conclude that the praised insights are not there. Rather, he or she would find
debates and dead ends in a disciplinary field that is as unsettled as law or
politics.
In terms of interdisciplinarity, what insights can we import into law from
the dynamic field of the history, philosophy, and sociology of science? As
discussed in the next section, while courts have strong social constructivist
views of science, some have developed a weak constructivist approach - a
"pragmatic constructivism" - in response to the complex debates surrounding
the nature and philosophy of science.
377. See generally Fiona Godlee et al., Effect on the Quality of Peer Review of Blinding
Reviewers andAskingThem to Sign TheirReports, 280 JAMA237 (1998); Redding, supra note
69, at 594 (discussing scientists' biases).
378. Deason, for example, stated:
The scientific view of the world has changed .... Certainly there is no general
belief that scientific professionals are "disinterested." Today there is still an
appreciation that the goal of science is objective inquiry, but there is also a growing
awareness that science... takes place in a social and political context
[Kuhn] revolutionized how we view science .... We now speak of paradigms.
Deason, supra note 17, at 99-100, 116. Browne, Keeley, & Him, on the other hand, readily
conceded that the unified perspective they presented differed from contemporary positivist and
realist accounts of science. The authors smoothly combined Rouse, Fleck, Yonay, Gieryn,
Fuchs & Pfeffer into a compelling alternative account of science without highlighting the
diversity of perspectives in science studies. See Browne et al., supra note 17, at 51-65.
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VI'. Pragmatic Legal Constructivism
A. The Status of Social Constructivism in Law
In any truly public battle, those arguing for constructivism
in general will lose to those arguing for reality in general.'
The journal Science Communication recently published one of the most
important studies of how social constructivism is represented in the discipline
of law.380 Its authors, Gary Edmund and David Mercer, are scholars in law
and in the sociology of scientific knowledge. They argued that, contrary to
the impression given by the citations in Daubert and by numerous legal
scholars, social constructivism has not been accommodated in American legal
discourse. 8' Rather, the insights available from the sociology of scientific
knowledge have been misappropriated and thereby excluded from legal
theorizing about the nature of scientific activity.38
Professor Jasanoff, therefore, risked overstatement when she identified a
post-Daubert 'tolerance of multiple viewpoints about how science works." '383
One of the important amicus briefs filed by the Carnegie Commission on
Science, Technology, and Government inDaubert cited a "small body of work
in the social studies of science," including some of Jasanoff's writing on law
and science, but only made references to: (1) the extremism of her construc-
tivist perspective, (2) her view that science is provisional (a view shared by
non-constructivist briefs), (3) her acknowledgment of the limitations of peer
379. George Levine, What Is Science Studies For and Who Cares? 46-47 SOC. TEXT 1,
126 (1996).
380. See Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Representing the Sociology of Scientific Knowl-
edge andLaw, 19 SCL COMM. 307 (1998).
381. Id. at 308-09. For example, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SClENarFIc EVIDENCE (1994)), which now sits on the bench of every federal judge in the United
States, contains no hint of the constructivist view. Nor do the highly influential volumes
FAIGmANET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIc EVIDENE, supra note 4, and ANDRE A. MoENssENs ET
AL., SaEN C EVDENE CvimAND CR NAL TR4S (4thed. 1995). Rather, these treatises
all have a strongly positivist orientation, deferring to empirical scientific methodology as the
sine qua non of good (and thus legally admissible) science. As Professor Levine pointed out
in his review of Modern Scientific Evidence: "If I were to sum up their viewpoint, I would say
the author-editors disapprove of testimony deriving from any field that lacks a body of literature
ruling out plausible rival hypotheses in well-designed experiments that allow for the determina-
tion of a precise error rate." Murray Levine, 'The Legal Culture MustAssimilate the Scientific
Culture" and Vice Versa?, 21 LAW & PoL'Y 77,83 (1999). Thus, scientific innovation may be
discouraged. See id. at 87 (noting that "if judges use Shari Diamond's description of what
constitutes a good survey, those offering survey data as part of expert testimony will have to
meet the best standards in the field").
382. See Edmond & Mercer, supra note 380, at 308-9.
383. Id. at 308 (citing Sheila JasanoffBeyondEpistemology Relativism andEngagement
in the Politics ofScience, 26 Soc. STUD. SCL 393,408 (1996)).
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review as a standard for good science (a view which does not rely on
constructivist accounts), and (4) her view that science is dynamic and facts
indeterminate. 4 The latter was not used in the brief to draw a constructivist
conclusion, but rather to conclude that courts should "concern themselves with




Justice Blackmun cited Jasanoff in Daubert, but only for the proposition that
publication "does not necessarily correlate with reliability"386 - nowhere "else
in the judgment is Jasanoff's work, or any other constructivist perspective,
referred to.,,3" Not only was constructivism not accommodated, but the Court
cited Jasanoff to support "the anti-constructivist perspective of Popper's
falsification."388 According to Edmond and Mercer, by the time Daubert was
on remand to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals any constructivist component
of Justice Blackmun's opinion was lost. Instead, the criterion of general
acceptance (peer review and publication) along with a new preference for
research independent of litigation dominated the court of appeals' analysis. 8 9
Edmond and Mercer also surveyed legal scholarship to reinforce their
thesis that constructivism has not been accommodated in law and science
discourse."'
384. See id. at 310-12.
385. Id. (quoting Jasanoff, supra note 383, at 408).
386. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
387. Edmond & Mercer, supra note 380, at 312.
388. Id.
389. See id. at 313-14 (discussing Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals's application of Daubert
standard).
390. See id. at 314-18. The courts' pragmatism does, however, implicitly acknowledge at
least one aspect of the constructivist argument There is no preinterpretive science, particularly
when it comes to science used in the adversary process of litigation. Science loses its claim to
value neutrality or objectivism when put in the service of helping to resolve legal or policy
disputes. Science may describe reality, but science cannot prescribe how empirical reality can
or should inform legal policy. Rather, science in legal disputes is used as part and parcel of a
larger narrative molded by the litigants and factfinders.
Changing the narrative can require shifts in evidence... [w]hat is deemed as "evi-
dence" or scientific is susceptible to redefinition in line with the entire narrative.
The evidence influences the narrative but the narrative simultaneously structures
the status of the evidence... The various narrative accounts are often created
alongside relevant scientific knowledge. The narratives are designed to accommo-
date, favorably frame and utilize the scientific evidence. In turn they provide a
framework which gives the evidence meaning.
Gary Edmond, Science, Law and Narrative: Helping the 'Facts' to Speakfor Themselves, 23
S. IL. U. L. 555, 580-83 (1999).
Through pragmatic constructivism, courts implicitly acknowledge their inability to sep-
arate "science" from the overall legal and policy narrative within which it is embedded. Federal
courts, therefore, might not "apply" or "interpret" the Daubert guidelines, rather, they "perform"
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Predominantly, Jasanoff's work is cited [only] as a critique of peer review
and as a source for evidence on such problems as scientific fraud, judges
inappropriately constructing science in courts.... and the power of courts
to expose junk science...."I
Jasanoff's insight that courts participate in the social construction of scientific
truth is generally misunderstood by courts and legal scholars or seen as
problematical. 92 While a minority of commentators seem to appreciate
Jasanoff's constructivist arguments, "awareness" does not usually "equate
with alignment or accommodation."393 Edmond and Mercer concluded that
constructivism is selectively misappropriated rather than accommodated. To
explain the court's reluctance to accommodate constructivism, Edmond and
Mercer pointed to the legal system's own "self-image suggesting that legal
practice is similar to ideal images of science, [and] that its practices are based
on the objective discovery of facts and impersonal application of rules.
3 94
Consider, however, Professor Farrell's view that lawyers and judges are
well aware of the way in which law constructs its own knowledge.39 Rather
Daubert, much in the same way actors act out a play. See Denis . Brion, Performing the
Constitution, 49 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 293,294 (1992) (looking at Constitution as performance
document to be acted out in different ways at different times). In this conception, the perfor-
mance shows us that "science" as used in law is not something inherent in positivism nor is it
a social construction - "[it] is the product of the performance of the text" Id. Since no two
performances are the same, the result is a pluralistic interpretation of science in the courts which
serves to protect against scientific hegemony. Here, Quine's principle of the "web of belief' issignificait - that the truth of any one proposition is dependent upon its relationship to other
propositions; a change in any one part of the web of belief can change the entire belief system
or constituent propositions. See Michael A. Livingston, Postmodernism Meets Practical
Reason, 107 YALE L.. 1125, 1133 n.32 (1998) (presenting Quine's description of science as
web of belief). No two performances of Daubert, as applied to a particular body of scientific
evidence, will be exactly the same - the web of belief and constituent propositions fluctuate.
391. Edmond & Mercer, supra note 380, at 314-15.
392. Id. at315.
393. Id. at 318.
394. IaM at 319. See generally Howard Schweber, The "Science" of Legal Science: The
Model of the Natural Sciences in Nineteenth-CentwyAmerican LegalEducation, 17 L. & HIs.
REv. 421 (1998) (discussing "version of American legal science that looked to the natural
science for its metaphors, its methods, and its legitimating claims").
395. See Farrell, supra note 17, at 2197. Farrell stated:
The legal community may be especially self-conscious about the way in which it
socially constructs facts and the reasons it does so. Lawyers, judges, and legal
scholars identify and evaluate endlessly the standards and procedures they use to
give legal effect to factual propositions. They are conscious of the social institu-
tions (courts, judges, administrative tribunals, and legislatures) and the processes
(evidentiay hearings, judicial notice, precedent, etc.) through which the legal facts
are produced.
JUNK PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE?
than seeing an affinity, as Edmond and Mercer suggested, '"between legalistic
discourses and scientific discourses in their shared appeal to simplistic empiri-
cist accounts of knowledge creation,"396 Farrell highlighted the social con-
structivism that is readily embraced among lawyers, judges, and legislators for
law, but not science? This might explain why Edmond and Mercer say
Farrell did not embrace constructivism.3r However, Farrell certainly em-
braced the view that courts produce or co-produce scientific knowledge
alongside some scientific evidence.
While we agree with Edmond and Mercer that judicial and legal schol-
arly literature do not include genuinely constructivist accounts of science, we
find a weak or "pragmatic" form of"legal construction of science" inDaubert
and in many lower federal court opinions applying Daubert. Briefly, the
search for scientific truth by scientists, whatever its level of certitude and
utility outside of law, is set aside in favor of a pragmatic view of scientific
truth as useful in a legal controversy. Justice Blackmun acknowledged that
it is not "cosmic understanding" but a "particularized resolution" that the law
needs. Thus, even if "authentic insights and innovations" are occasionally
missed,3" lower court federal judges are permitted to construct a little scien-
tific knowledge in court.
In his dissent in Joiner, Justice Stevens criticized the majority for its
restrictive interpretation of Daubert. The Court found no abuse of discretion
in the trial judge's exclusion of expert testimony, which Justice Stevens would
have considered permissible scientific evidence:
It is not intrinsically "unscientific" for experienced professionals to arrive
at a conclusion by weighing all available scientific evidence - this is not
the sort of 'junk science" with which Daubert was concerned. After
all, ... the [EPA] uses the same methodology to assess risks .... I
Justice Stevens then highlighted the pragmatic approach to scientific knowl-
edge at trial by emphasizing that it would not "have been an abuse of discre-
tion to admit the expert testimony." 401  In other words, the "gatekeeping"
standards are flexible and are not tied to extra-legal scientific standards.
396. Edmond & Mercer, supra note 380, at 319.
397. Lawyers, judges, and legal scholars "recognize that the legitimacy or validity of legal
facts depends upon whether the processes through which they are found conform with standards
agreed upon, formally and informally, within the legal community - broadly defined to include
its official and unofficial political institutions." Farrell, supra note 17, at 2197.
398. See Edmond & Mercer, supra note 380, at 318.
399. Daubert v. Merril Dow Phanms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,597 (1993).
400. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 153 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
401. Id. at 155 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Again in United States v. Scheffer,4°2 Justice Stevens dissented when the
Court confirmed the constitutionality of a military rule of evidence prohibiting
polygraph evidence in court-martial proceedings by finding that there is no
consensus regarding the reliability of such evidence °.4 3 Because "a host of
studies ... place the reliability of polygraph tests at 85% to 90%," Justice
Stevens argued that its usefulness ought to be tested in adversary proceed-
ings.404 Thus, in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, Justice Stevens concurred
with the majority's explication of the flexibility of the Daubert gatekeeping
role for federal judges, who must have "considerable leeway" and "latitude"
when assessing an expert's reliability.40"
In sun, the form of constructivism that has developed in judicial law-
and-science discourse is not "full-blown" social constructivism, which calls
into question scientific objectivity, but legal-social constructivism that '"brack-
ets" scientific objectivity as too complex for courts to depend upon. Thus,
without taking a position on social constructivism, or by taking a wishful
position that science is relatively objective but not always accessible to law,
some federal courts have adopted a pragmatic constructivism to avoid ques-
tioning the nature of scientific discovery and progress. Whether such courts
have successfully avoided a philosophical stance depends in part on one's
view of pragmatism generally. Pragmatists think they avoid over-daring
theories, while critics think that pragmatism is often a guise for undisclosed
or even unwitting theoretical commitments. We tend toward the latter view,
thus we argued that the philosophy of science is unavoidable in judicial
applications of Daubert guidelines to determine the admissibility of scientific
evidence. On the other hand, there is no difference in practice between prag-
matic constructivists who are (or think they are) avoiding theory and those
who adopt (or unwittingly adopt) that "constructivist" position (1) because
science is socially constructed or (2) because the best science is not always
accessible to law.
B. Law's Alternative: Pragmatic Socio-Legal Constructivism
Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision.
Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and
quickly.
M
402. 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
403. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303,320-39 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
404. Id. at 333, 335 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
405. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Cannichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999); id. at 159 (Stevens,
I., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
406. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
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[Tihe law works not by identifying and then hewing to
some overarching set of principles, or logical calculus, or
authoritative revelation, but by deploying a set of ram-
shackle and heterogeneous resources in an effort to reach
political resolutions of disputes that must be framed ....
By the standards applied to determinate and principled
procedures, the law fails miserably ... butby the pragmatist
standard... the law gets passing and even high marks be-
cause it works.'
In Part IV above, we identified a "liberal" philosophical perspective
based on (1) viewing the Daubert factors as flexible, (2) keeping a strong
distinction between conclusions and methodology, and (3) acknowledging the
possibility of conflicting, admissible scientific testimony, which roughly ends
up emphasizing scientific uncertainty and the utility of novel science in the
same way that progressive philosophies of science do. We contrasted that
with a "conservative" philosophical perspective based on (1) viewing the
Daubert factors as guidelines, (2) collapsing the conclusions/methodology
distinction, and (3) downplaying the likelihood that two conflicting scientific
theories can both be good science, which roughly ends up emphasizing the
stability of mainstream scientific knowledge in accordance with traditional
philosophies of science. While the pragmatic constructivist approach may
seem to reflect the liberal perspective, it is oddly consistent with a traditional
view of science as a producer of stable knowledge on its own turf, in its own
time. Because the law's need for science is unpredictable, so is the science
that may be available when law calls.
Chief Judge Posner, in Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,4 s explained that "the
courtroom is not the place for scientific guesswork, even of the inspired sort.
'Law lags science,' it does not lead it."4" It bears mentioning that Rosen does
not interpret Daubert to admit novel scientific testimony."' To the contrary,
the proposition that law lags science tends to restrict science to what is
407. Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: The Jurisprudence of Richard Posner, Richard
Rorty, andRonaldDworkin, in THERE's No Sucn TING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD
THING, Too 200,209 (1994).
408. 78 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 1996).
409. Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996). Similarly, Professor
Milich emphasized that law must not outpace science. See Mulch, supra note 240, at 915
(stating "law's faith in science must not race ahead of science itself'). But law can usefully
inform scientific research. See generally Redding, supra note 69 (discussing how common-
sense psychology inherent in law can inform social science, and ways in which law has
informed and actually outpaced scientific progress in certain areas of social science).
410. See Rosen, 78 F.3d at 320 (-The district court was within its discretion in concluding
that the scientific evidence of causation that the plaintiff offered was not admissible .... ").
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"generally accepted." 411 When scientific controversies arise, however, the so-
called "default" position is not exactly deferential to the mainstream scientific
community. Rather, some courts may reject scientific propositions supported
by substantial evidence if that evidence is not convincingly presented at trial.
Alternatively, professional opinions and "shaky" science "not yet accepted as
canonical" can be admitted. 412 The level of reliability required in science may
exceed that required by law, and a mass of less-than-reliable scientific evi-
dence may produce a rather reliable sum total of evidence for law.413 Con-
versely, scientifically reliable research studies may produce statistically
"significant" (i.e., reliable) findings that have little or no practical or social
significance. This significance is determined not by whether there are statisti-
cally reliable differences but by whether such differences are sizeable enough
that they actually matter in the real world. The degree to which courts deem
research to be "valid" or "reliable" depends upon the purpose and circum-
stances for which it is used. Thus, validity and reliability are conditional and
contingent, not fixed and unitary:
[A]ll researchers - whether they work with numbers or words, in the
laboratory or in the field - must grapple with issues of generalizability,
validity, replicability, ethics, audience, and their own subjectivity or bias.
Moreover, all researchers must engage questions ofauthorityandinterpre-
tation. Whether numbers or words, data do not speak for themselves.
They acquire meaning onlywithinthe framework(s) oftheoryandinterpre-
tation imposed by researchers.414
While critical self-reflection concerning values and inter-subjectivity is
common in qualitative research endeavors, it is rare in quantitative research
studies deemed "scientific." 415 Yet, the stories of lived experiences found in
qualitative research are precisely the kind of storytelling long approved in the
tribunals of law. When courts construct a set of facts for the adjudication of
a particular case, those facts may or may not correspond to an objective,
veridical reality. Pragnmtic constructivism, consistent with pragmatism gener-
ally, also seems to view truth as relative to its perceived consequences. This
potentially limits the tendency for courts to assume, via the veil of "objective"
411. See id. at 319 ( "But the courtroom is not the place for scientific guesswork, even of
the inspired sort').
412. See id. at 318 (finding evidence admissible even if based on novel methods); id. at
319 ("There may be evidence to back up [the] claim, but none was presented to the district
court.").
413. Id. at 318.
414. Jeanne Mareek et al., Working Between Worlds: Qualitative Methods and Social
Psychology, 53 . Soc. IssUES 631,632 (1997).
415. See id. at 635.
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science,41 6 "ultimate power to interpret another's experience... by virtue of
the prestige, status, and authority afforded to [academic researchers] ... to
define the right, the good, the best, the ideal.
417
Recall that inn re Paoli R.R. YardPCB Litigation, the court emphasized
the screening function of the trial judge:
The evidentiaryrequirement ofreliabilityis lowerthanthe merits standard
of correctness .... The grounds for the expert's opinion merely have to
be good, they do not have to be perfect. The judge might think that there
are good grounds for an expert's conclusion even ifthe judge think that
there are better grounds for some alternate conclusion, and even if the
judge thinks thata scientist's methodologyhas some flaws suchthatifthey
had been corrected, the scientist would have reached a different result.
418
Thus, the view that the proper inquiry is "what experts in relevant discipline
deem it to be" has been rejected in favor of the gatekeeping role for federal
judges.419 Moreover, review oftrial court admissibility determinations remain
crucial because 'there is a significant risk that district judges will set the
threshold too high.1
420
This is not to suggest that federal trial and appeals courts do not tie their
evidentiary standards to the Daubert definitions of valid scientific methodol-
ogy. In Summers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad System, 421 the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion of testimony that was not based on
"acceptable scientific levels of methodology and criteria" and was based on
unvalidated preliminary research.4' Similarly, inBelofskyv. GeneralElectric
Co.,423 a district court judge granted a motion to exclude expert testimony that
was not based on adequate scientific methods. Indeed, the court failed to find
"any method in [the expert's] madness."424 Finally, in Target Market Publish-
ing v. ADVO,42 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion
416. Law, of course, offers up the same veil of disinterestedness. See Michael D. WeissA
Jurisprudence of Blindness: Rawls' Justice and Legal Theory, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 565, 566
(1993) (discussing veil of ignorance pierced by legal realist and critical legal studies movements).
417. MarkB. TappanInterpretivePsychology: Stories, Circles, and UnderstandingLived
Experience, 53 J. Soc. ISSUES 645,655 (1997).
418. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717,744 (3d Cir. 1994).
419. Id. at 747,748.
420. Id. at 750 (discussing risk of too high threshold due to amorphous "reliability standard
of Rules 702 and 703").
421. 132 F.3d 599 (10th Cir. 1997).
422. Summers v. Missouri Pae. R.R. Sys., 132 F3d 599,604 (10th Cir. 1997).
423. 980 F. Supp. 818 (D.V.L 1997).
424. Belofsky v. General Elec. Co., 980 F. Supp. 818, 823 (D.V.I 1997).
425. 136 F.3d 1139 (7th Cir. 1998).
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of evidence based on "assumptions that [did] not legitimately support the
conclusion.Y
426
Nevertheless, in Cabrera v. Cordis Corp.,427 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals quoted Daubert for the proposition that soundness of methodology,
not the correctness of the expert's conclusions, is the test for admissibility 42
(even though the appeals court affirmed the exclusion of testimony as unreli-
able and based on "underground knowledge, untested and unknown to the
scientific community")."V In Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of Puerto Rico Bot-
tling Co., the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed thetrial court's exclusion
of expert testimony, confirming that judges need not decide between method-
ologically sound scientific theories in conflict.43 Requiring scientific certainty
"solicits a level of assurance that science realistically cannot achieve and that
Daubert does not demand;" such a standard "changes the trial judge's role...
from that of gate-keeper to that of armed guard. "
431 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals en banc opinion in Moore v. Ashland Chemical Inc.432 also empha-
sized scientific uncertainty and the difference '"etween truth-seeking in the
courtroom and in the laboratory. ' 433 Reliability is not correctness, 434 and "thie
law cannot wait for future scientific investigation and research. 4 35 While the
majority affirmed the exclusion of evidence as not grounded in science, a
strong dissent questioned whether the application of Daubert to clinical
testimony was too restrictive:
The en banc majority adopts a mechanistic interpretation of the Daubert
factors that threatens to require the exclusion from evidence ofvast num-
bers of clinical medical opinions, although they are generally accepted as
trustworthy by physicians practicing in their fields ....
426. Target Mkt. Publ'g v. ADVO, 136 F.3d 1139,1144 (7th Cir. 1998).
427. 134 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1998).
428. See Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 134 F.3d 1418, 1421 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 1995)).
429. Id. at 1423.
430. Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77,85 (1st Cir. 1998).
431. Id. at 86.
432. 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998).
433. Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269,275 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993)), cert denied, 526 U.S. 1064 (1999).
434. Id. at 276 ("The proponent need not prove to the judge that the expert's testimony
is correct, but she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the testimony is reli-
able.").
435. Id.
436. Id. at 286 (Dennis, C.L, dissenting).
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JUNK PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE?
In the dissent's view, "hard" science was not the only science to which parties
may appeal.
437
While we maintain that there is no escape from the inevitability of taking,
even unwittingly, a philosophical position on the nature of the scientific
enterprise, the particular position taken is rendered almost irrelevant in the
pragmatic constructivist mode of analysis. A judge may think that science
always operates in an influential social context, or that the best science rises
above social determinants in its access to nature or reality. Courts, however,
can set aside both positions to focus on legal science, which is constructed in
court by experts who bring the best that they have to court that day.
The pragmatism used by courts in interpreting and applying scientific
evidence reflects the interpretive community in which courts operate.438 As
Stanley Fish argued, evidence is given meaning through the interpretive com-
munity (comprising shared values, biases, beliefs, and assumptions) of which
the factfinder is a part: there is no ultimate truth, only local truths.4 " We
cannot do objective science because 'the mental operations we can perform
are limited by the institutions in which we are already embedded." 440 It is not
surprising that different courts and jurisdictions may produce differing
results - differing pragmatic constructions of the very same scientific evi-
dence, because each interpretive community constructs its own truth from the
scientific evidence at hand. In a variety of ways, these, constructions can
usefully inform empirical science." Experiential data often drive hypothesis
formulation in science, with preliminary observations and theories having
significant "common-sense" validity before they are confirmed through rigor-
ous scientific testing.
Given the courts' pragmatic approach to constructing a science for the
case, we return to the status of social constructivism in law's interdisciplinary
borrowings.
437. See id. at 281 n.2 (Dennis, C.J., dissenting) ("Where the expert does not propose to
testify to an opinion based on hard scientific methodology, [Daubert] indicated that the relia-
bility of his opinion should be assessed according to the methodology of the expert's own
discipline.").
438. See BLAtNZ. TAmANAHAREATc SOCiAL-LEGAL THEORY: PRAGMATISMAND A
SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW 142-52 (1997) (arguing law represents consensus about need to apply
coercion to support particular norm in given situation).
439. See generally STAN= FisH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AuTHORITY OF
INTERPREMEVE COMMUNimES (1980).
440. Id. at 331.
441. See Redding, supra note 82, at 118-36 (discussing ways in which common sense or
received wisdom inherent in law can inform social science research).
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C. Interdisciplinarity and Social Constructivism
According to Professor Farrell, courts and commentators have retreated
to or remained in a positivist framework and have not adopted the view that
law and science are both socially-constructed enterprises. Similarly, in
accordance with the assessment of Edmond and Mercer, courts and commen-
tators have never really accommodated constructivist views of the scientific
enterprise. But post-Daubert jurisprudence on the relations between law and
science is not so easily characterized either as positivist or constructivist.
Such a dualism tends to hide the pragmatic form of constructivism that has
been celebrated since Daubert loosened the Frye link between mainstream
science and law. Although courts have not seriously questioned the positivist
features of science, the pragmatic constructivism of the courts - constructing
a "science for the case" out of proffered expert testimony - is comfortably
acknowledged in post-Daubert jurisprudence. Farrell is correct that a social
constructivist approach to science has not taken hold in law, and Edmond and
Mercer are correct that scientific constructivism has been misappropriated and
misunderstood. But the positivism that these scholars set up in opposition to
constructivist views is not the only alternative. Rather, a pragmatic legal
constructivism, which would not satisfy social constructivists, arose from the
mildly critical view that science is a dynamic and uncertain enterprise.
Significantly, this alternative position indirectly reflects the controversies
within the fields of the history, philosophy, and sociology of science. A lively
debate continues in the scholarly literature about the nature of scientific
practices. The debate is not between old-fashioned objectivists (though there
are a few) and social constructivists who believe that scientific facts are
manufactured entirely out of and are explainable wholly by reference to social
relations. Instead, it is between those who readily concede the social aspects
of science, but cannot quite decide what role "nature" plays in scientific
practice. On the one hand, theories affect what one measures and "sees," as
do the institutions of science (training, funding, research programs, experi-
mental conventions, instrumentation) and established rhetorical networks of
persuasion. On the other hand, "nature" is sometimes wholly constructed,
sometimes a resistance against which "reality" is constructed, but is rarely an
effect unblemished by perceptions or expectations. Narrative devices may be
deeply present in every field of science and all seeing perspectival and all
knowledge situated, but the world is partly object, a co-participant in knowl-
edge production, a constraint on perception.44
2
442. LATOUR, supra note 81, at 6. Latour stated:
Yes, the scientific facts are indeed constructed, but they cannot be reduced to the
social dimension because this dimension is populated by objects mobilized to con-
JUNK PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE?
These aphorisms are not the stable insights of a discipline, but problems
or anomalies for any account of science. Where does nature end and society
begin? Or is that the wrong question altogether - a divisive dualism that
eclipses the second dimension (beyond the nature-society pole) that could
account for quasi-objects, nonhuman actors, or entities as trajectories that
occupy "many states, being impurely social, then purely social, then purely
natural, then impurely natural?"1443 These are matters for intense and ongoing
disciplinary debate, not the settled insights available for importation into law.
As insights, they are unsettling. While it would be an overstatement to
say that courts and most legal commentators engaged those debates, it is likely
that a danger sign was sent to the field of law by the unsettled character ofthe
history, philosophy, and sociology of science as suggested by the amicus
briefs inDaubert and as faintly reflected inDaubert itself. If "arguably, there
are no certainties in science," 4" wait until you see the history, philosophy, and
sociology of science! If courts have no time for theoretical disputes in science
because law "must resolve disputes ... quickly,"44 then the theory of theoreti-
cal disputes in science is extremely low on the interdisciplinarity priority list.
The problems identified in studies of science, however, will not go away.
Science is an historical affair, affected and/or constituted by social relations,
and its conclusions are "subject to perpetual revision."" 6 Once that insight is
acknowledged, a position on science is unavoidable. However, instead of
adopting a traditional view of scientific objectivity, courts can simply bracket
or ignore the question of scientific certainty or causal precision. Let the
scientists testify and then construct certainty and causality for a particular
legal, factual controversy. If the judgment turns out to be "incorrect" by later
developments in science, correctness was never the issue in the first place. 7
struet it.... The ozone hole is too social and too narrated to be truly natural; the
strategy of industrial firms and heads of state is too full of chemical reaclions to be
reduced to power and interest; the discourse of the ecosphere is too real and too
social to boil down to meaning effects. Is it our fault if the networks are simulta-
neously real, like nature, narrated, like discourse, and collective, like society?
Id.
443. Latour, supra note 228, at 286.
444. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 573,590 (1993).
445. Id. at 597.
446. Id.
447. But law's legitimacy is drawn into question when it produces questionable, random,
or inconsistent outcomes based on the same body of scientific evidence. See David L. Faigman,
"Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 604 (1991) ("[P]ersistent misapplication of
empirical data undermines the Court's legitimacy."); Veilleux, supra note 341, at 1994 ("Sci-
ence is the American faith .... To the extent that the public believes the courts are following
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This is pragmatic, legal constructivism. Justice Breyer's crusade for truth
and the crusaders against junk science4 9 lost the battle for scientific authority
in law, but they did not lose to social constructivists. They lost to legal
pragmatists, including federal judges whom are grateful not to have to become
philosophers of science.
VIII. Conclusion
One does not come away from [Matthew Fontaine] Maury's
work with the sense that Nature has been represented; in-
stead, SailingDirections [1854] provokes a feeling ofbeing
overwhelmed at the ongoing work required to produce the
inscriptions that enable a range ofhumans and nonhunans
to form alliances and consequently predict and control
enough socio-technical-natural patterns to accomplish a
specific task.'
As Justice Blackmum explained in Daubert, courts must act quickly to
resolve legal disputes, and in cases involving scientific issues, courts cannot
wait for scientists to resolve their own controversies. Similarly, when the
Court began an abstract inquiry into the characteristics of good science to set
standards for admissibility of expert scientific testimony, it needed to act
quickly. We might wish that the Court would have surveyed the disputes in
the history, philosophy, and sociology of science; acknowledged the diverse
positions in the field; and then, aflter selecting its preference, carefully de-
fended that position against existing criticism. In the rush to judgment, the
a scientific procedure, they are likely to have more confidence that the procedure produced the
right result (credibility) and to have more respect for the procedure itself (legitimacy).") In the
Bendectin cases, for example, the outcomes of the jury trials were very inconsistent and some
juries awarded sizeable damages against the manufacturer, though subsequent rigorous research
consistently failed to establish a causal link between the drug and birth defects. See Joseph
Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1, 4-27 (1993) (presenting discussion of Bendectin trials and lack of evidence
of causation). According to Professor Schuck, this helped to further discredit the tort system,
forced Bendectin off the market, and cost the company substantial amounts of money. Peter H.
Schuck,Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and Politics, 11 YALE L. & POL'YREV. 1,22-
23 (1993). "The law's repudiation of bad science in the Bendectin litigation thus came tragi-
cally late." Id. at 23.
448. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 150 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(presenting "ascertainment of truth" as basic objective of Federal Rules of Evidence). Signifi-
cantly, however, Justice Breyer's majority opinion in Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), is
strikingly pragmatic in how "flexible" the Daubert factors became.
449. See Koukoutchos, supra note 17, at 2250-51.
450. T. Hugh Crawford, Networking the (Non) Human: Moby-Dick, Matthew Fontaine
Maury, and Bruno Latour, 5 CoNFIGURATIONS 1, 17 (1997).
JUNK PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE?
Court told a story, that is, constructed a narrative about how science operates.
Only by reading the briefs does one get the idea that the Court was adopting
the "now" view of science that replaced an "old" view, and that the two-view
argument was also a narrative constructed to make it easy on the justices. A
more accurate representation of the field of science studies would have
identified at least three alernatives to traditional views of science as autono-
mous, namely:. (1) "weak" social theories that identify the influences on
science of theoretical paradigms, individual interests, and the norms of scien-
tific communities; (2) "stronger" social theories that characterize science as
a cultural activity that produces facts in reliance not on nature, but on rhetori-
cal conventions and a "theatre" of experiments; and (3) co-production theories
that attempt to avoid ultimate references to either nature or society, since both
are in play in any scientific enterprise. Variations persist within these broad
frameworks, of course, and the debates are as many-sided and inconclusive as
any other philosophical controversy. The United States Supreme Court,
therefore, could not enter these debates and, on balance, justifiably pick a
winner.
The paradox, of course, is that the Court had to pick a winner, or at least
try to pick a winner. The definition of science announced in Daubert was
ambiguous. Thus, federal courts enjoy a certain philosophical leeway along-
side and paralleling their leeway to make reliability determinations. Interest-
ingly, the behavior of federal courts in imposing criteria for science, by virtue
of legal authority, is not so different from Bruno Latour's view ofthe behavior
of laboratory scientists. According to Latour, scientists do not need universal
laws or theoretical certitude to succeed; they only need to control enough facts
to produce convincing, local knowledge.45' Courts have become Latourian
laboratories, controlling enough facts to draw a conclusion that is enforceable
againstthe parties, ifnot againstthe tribunals ofreason- Latour's term for the
general population who act as judges of scientific progress.4 52
451. See id. at 16-17.
According to a constructivist view of knowledge, learning may better be character-
ized by parallel constructions relating to specific contexts. This means that parallel
and maybe even competing, ways of constructing reality develop and provide the
basis for new forms of knowledge.... Research-based knowledge, which is often
abstract and general in nature, must be transformed to a concrete example that can
be used and used in a specific and practical setting.
Glenn Hultman & CrisinaRobertsonHorbergKnowledge Competition and PersonalAmbifion,
19 ScI. CoMM. 328,341,343 (1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
452. See LATOUR, supra note 81, at 18 (discussing Robert Boyle's scientific work). Latour
stated:
Ironically, the key question of the constructivists - arc facts thoroughly constructed
in the laboratory? . . . - is precisely the question that Boyle raised and resolved.
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. Some federal courts have adopted a view of science not visible by the
current interdisciplinary contributions in the field of law and science. It is a
unique position driven by pragmatic concerns, much the same way that those
legal scholars, who try to influence the judiciary in their amicus briefs or in
legal periodicals, are driven by pragmatic uses of the pedagogical divisions
between two views in the field of the history, philosophy, and sociology of
science. Social constructivism, it is true, has not yet had its day in court or in
the field of legal commentary. But we can identify a pragmatic form of legal
constructivism based, in part, on the courts' inability to find an uncontrover-
sial representation of the scientific enterprise. Given the choice of (1) adopt-
ing an impoverished philosophy of science from Daubert, (2) ignoring the
philosophy of science and unwittingly taking a position, or (3) setting aside
the problem by isolating a world of legal science, the latter seems best. At
least we are not pretending that the philosophy of science is conclusive and
settled. Rather, we see its complexity and back away, recognizing law's pur-
poses and limits.
Yes, the facts are indeed constructed in the new installation of the laboratory and
though the artificial intermediary of the air pump .... But are the facts that have
been constructed by man artifactual for that reason? No... we know the nature of
the facts because we have developed them in circumstances that are under our
complete control .... Boyle turns a flaw - we produce only matters of fact that are
created in laboratories and have only local value - into a decisive advantage: these
facts will never be modified, whatever may happen elsewhere in theory, metaphys-
ics, religion, politics or logic.
